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Terrorism is back, and over the years, it has waned and waxed.1 Having 
reached high points in the early and late 1970s, and again in the mid-1980s, and 
a low point in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it is now again on an upswing.2  
The emergence of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the early 1990s represented 
the radicalization of the Filipino Muslim separatist movement.  The group’s first 
recorded operation was in 1991, when it attacked a military checkpoint on the 
outskirts of the town of Isabela, on Basilan Island.3  The group was responsible 
for a series of kidnappings and attacks from 1993 to 1995, when a ceasefire 
between the government and the MNLF was holding throughout Mindanao.  On 
14 April 1995, Abu Sayyaf attacked the town of Ipil, robbing banks, and burning 
the town center and fleeing with 30 hostages, men, women, and children. The 
Ipil attack left 53 people dead and many wounded. On 25 March 2000, ASG’s 
Janjalani faction kidnapped 58 students and teachers, including Catholic priest 
Father Roel Gallardo in Sumisip, Basilan.  Six of the kidnap victims, and Father 
Gallardo were killed.  A little more than a month after Janjalani’s group carried 
out the elementary school kidnapping, the ASG group in Jolo took 21 hostages 
(10 Westerners, nine Malaysians, and two Filipinos) from a Sipadan diving resort 
in Malaysia.4  The kidnap netted Abu Sayyaf $20 million in ransom money 
reportedly paid by Libya.5  On 27 May 2001, another group of hostages, 
including three Americans, was seized at the Dos Palmas Resort on the Philippine 
island of Palawan, and taken to the group’s Basilan stronghold.  The kidnap 
                                       
1 David Tucker, “Responding to Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 21 (Winter 1998): 
103. 
2 Ibid., 103. 
3 Angel Rabasa, “Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists,” The 
Adelphi Papers, Oxford Journals, 01 July 2003, <http://www3.oup.co.uk/adelphi/hdb/ 
volume_358/Issue_011> (02 February 2004), 54.  
4 Maria Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al Qaeda’s Newest Center of 
Operation in Southeast Asia (NY: Free Press Simon and Schuster, 2003), 112. 
5 Rabasa, 54. 
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provoked a large-scale military operation that resulted in the death of a number 
of terrorists and hostages, as well as additional kidnappings.6  The war on 
terrorism has changed the lives of the Filipinos and strained the capacities of the 
government.  This war on terrorism presented several challenges and responses 
from the Philippine government.  Over the years, the Philippines has combated 
terrorism in many ways. It has retaliated militarily, prosecuted terrorists, 
preempted terrorist attacks, implemented defensive measures, and addressed 
some of the causes of terrorism. To some degree, all suffer from limited 
effectiveness and applicability.  The asymmetry between the terrorists, such as 
the ASG, and their victims, has placed the government at a disadvantage in the 
use of violence. An illustration pertains to the death of the American, Martin 
Burnham, during the military’s Operation Daybreak against the ASG on 07 June 
2002 in Basilan.  The different methods used by the Philippine government to 
combat terrorism did not develop all at once or arbitrarily.  The government has 
developed and adapted other methods as terrorism changed, and should be able 
to do so as terrorism changes in the future. In other words, the Philippine 
government should develop an effective strategy to counter terrorism.  
Therefore, questions need to be posed on how this war on terrorism, against 
Abu Sayyaf, be fought and on what or whom should this effort be focused?  This 
is important as the Philippines’ unstable political and economic conditions are 
compounded by the secessionist and terrorist problems mainly in the country’s 
Muslim south. The focus of this thesis, therefore, is the assessment of the 
government strategy in its response to ASG’s terrorism by examining the 
effectiveness of current government policies, including the governmental 
structure in counterterrorism. 
The U.S. Department of State currently designates the Abu Sayyaf Group 
as one of the 28 Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO).7  On 09 August 2002, the 
                                       
6 Ibid., 54. 
7 U.S. Department of State, “2001 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 05 October 
2001, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/ftp/2001/5258pf.htm> (29 February 2004). 
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Communist Party of the Philippines was likewise designated an FTO.  The Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front, although not on the U.S. Department of States’ FTO list, 
continues to use terrorist methods and tactics to advance its political agenda of 
becoming an independent Islamic state. Some saw Abu Sayyaf as an 
international fundamentalist movement linked to Osama bin Laden, others as a 
group manipulated by the Armed Forces as a kind of agent provocateur, while 
others condemned it as no more than a bandit gang intent on amassing funds 
through kidnapping for ransom.8  According to Putzel, “it was most likely a 
combination of all three,” and while ASG was a loose coalition with some groups 
more committed to banditry than the pursuit of Islamic goals, key leaders of the 
organization represented a new radical Islam that gained considerable support 
throughout Basilan and the Sulu archipelago.9  The Abu Sayyaf could not have 
survived 13 years of the military’s pursuit without local support. The government 
has launched successive police and military operations in Basilan, Sulu, and the 
neighboring Zamboanga Peninsula, where the group has made some inroads.  
Over time, from 1991 to 2001, the military and police conducted search and 
destroy operations against the ASG.  The reported successes of these operations 
resulted in the death of charismatic leader Janjalani, and his trusted deputy, 
Edwin Angeles. The reports of the military and police about their successes 
against the ASG gave the public the impression that the ASG has been effectively 
decimated and no longer capable of terrorizing the nation, until its re-emergence 
in April 2000, with an attack using high-powered speedboats on the island resort 
of Sipadan in Malaysia.10  These daring and successful raids have not only 
proved that the group is still around and very much capable of executing terrorist 
attacks on soft targets, but it has also demonstrated its extended reach from its 
                                       
8 James Putzel, “Political Islam in Southeast Asia and the U.S.-Philippine Alliance,” in Global 
Responses To Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond, eds. Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn (NY: 
Routledge, 2003), 181.  
9 Ibid., 181. 
10 Alfredo Filler, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 14, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 132.  
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bases on Basilan island.11  The Australian government said it has evidence that 
Abu Sayyaf has likely expanded its ties with transnational terrorist organizations 
and developed its own terrorist repertoire.12 Australia is worried that Abu Sayyaf 
might evolve from a small kidnap gang into a full-fledged international terrorist 
group.13  Abu Sayyaf, generally regarded as a small band of bandits with an 
initial aim of establishing a separate Islamic state, has proven in the past that it 
could execute attacks on lightly guarded or “soft” targets, the same way 
international terrorist groups have been known to do. 
In the past decade, as Gunaratna asserts, “the center of gravity of 
terrorists,” shifted from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region.14  Accordingly, 
the shift essentially occurred when Lebanon was replaced by Afghanistan as the 
“major center of international terrorist training” in the early 1990s.  The terrorist 
elements then diffused into parts of Central Asia (Tajikistan, Afghanistan), South 
Asia (Kashmir, Pakistan), and Southeast Asia (Philippines, Indonesia).15  The 
Southeast Asian sub-region of the Asia-Pacific has 20 percent of the world’s 1.2 
billion Muslims from Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, and the Philippines.  
These areas have difficult-to-police maritime boundaries with parts of the 
Southern Philippines, such as Basilan, as well as Sulawesi and Maluku in 
Indonesia, which are relatively “ungoverned” and may prove to be potential 
lawless regions where it is easy for terrorist cells and terrorist groups to breed.16  
As far as Al Qaeda is concerned, its infiltration into Southeast Asia commenced in 
the early 1990s when Osama bin Laden forged a personal relationship with 
                                       
11 Ibid., 132. 
12 Marvin Sy, “Sayyaf May Become International Terror Group- Australia,” The Philippine 
Star, 21 July 2004, <http://www.philstar.com> (24 July 2004). 
13 Ibid., 1. 
14 Rohan Gunaratna, “Terrorist Trends and Patterns in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in The New 
Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends, and Counter-Strategies,” eds. Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna 
(Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2002), 129. 
15 Ibid., 129. 
16  Kumar Ramakrishna and Andrew Tan, “The New Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prescriptions” 
in The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends, and Counter-Strategies,” eds. Andrew Tan and Kumar 
Ramakrishna (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2002), 12. 
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Abdurajak Janjalani, the founder of Abu Sayyaf.17  In preparation to wage his 
global campaign, bin Laden established ties with two dozen Islamic terrorist 
groups and political parties, including the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines; 
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; the 
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party; the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria; al-Ansar 
Mujahidin in Chechnya; and Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia.18  The challenge 
today for the international community is not only to neutralize Al Qaeda but also 
its associated groups. Even if bin Laden is killed, the legacy he has established 
by creating a powerful international alliance of terrorist groups will continue to 
pose a threat to international security.19  
When Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the presidency in January 2001, her 
government adopted a three-pronged strategy to deal with the Islamic 
movement in Mindanao.  First, the administration moved to revive peace talks 
with the MILF.  Second, the administration threw its support behind a faction of 
the MNLF that had challenged Governor Misuari’s leadership and first endorsed 
the holding of a new referendum on autonomy in August 2001 and then the 
elections within the Autonomous region to follow in November, both of which 
were opposed by Misuari.  Third, her government declared “total war” against 
Abu Sayyaf, expressing its determination to bring the kidnapping crisis to an end 
and eliminate the terrorist group.20  The events of September 11 allowed the 
Macapagal-Arroyo government to put the Islamic movement on the defensive 
because of ASG’s connection with Al Qaeda’s international network of terrorists. 
The events of September 11 also became a political opportunity for her 
administration to seek and receive the direct assistance of the United States in 
the war against terrorism in Mindanao.  However, the intransigent attitude of 
                                       
17 Ramakrishna and Tan, 13.  
18 Rohan Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda: Organization and Operations,” in Global Responses to 
Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond, eds. Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn (NY: Routledge, 
2003), 37. 
19 Ibid., 37. 
20 Putzel, 182. 
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some government officials towards Muslim aspirations in Mindanao, including the 
failure to improve the unfair socio-economic conditions of the Muslims, was 
contributing to the rise of Islamic opposition.  
A.  PURPOSE 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the Philippine 
government’s response to terrorism and determine how it should develop an 
effective strategy to counter terrorism. In order to accomplish this, the thesis 
examines the organizational structure and the problems faced by the Philippine 
government agencies in addressing the terrorism specifically posed by the Abu 
Sayyaf Group. Secondly, the thesis will analyze Abu Sayyaf’s organizational and 
operational tools, its cohesion, existence, and maintenance of their terrorist 
capability. Finally, this thesis will examine the government bureaucracy, and its 
capability to respond well to the threats posed by terrorism. 
B.  IMPORTANCE 
The Philippines’ unstable political and economic conditions are 
compounded by the secessionist and terrorist problems mainly in the country’s 
Muslim south. One of the major security concerns of the present Macapagal-
Arroyo government is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Abdurazzak Abubakar 
Janjalani, a Tausug who participated as a mujahideen in the Afghanistan war in 
the late 1980s, founded the group. Abu Sayyaf split from the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1991 to propagate Islam through a jihad in Mindanao 
and Sulu Islands whose goal is an independent Islamic state. The United States 
has included the ASG in its list of foreign terrorist organizations and has been 
linked with Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network. Philippine authorities believe 
that the ASG has connections with Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, who was sentenced to 
240 years in solitary confinement in connection with the World Trade Center 
bombing in 1993.  
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Thus, looking over the historical perspective of this long-running conflict, 
it is important that the Philippine government seriously address the ASG threat 
and develop an adequate strategic response. 
C.  METHODOLOGY 
The primary methodology used in this thesis is to gather empirical 
evidence of Philippine responses to terrorism based on previous studies and 
publications that examine the counterterrorism experience of the Philippine 
government. 
This thesis focuses on three central questions of the Philippine response 
to terrorism: What are the organizational/structural problems faced by the 
Philippine government in countering the terrorism specifically posed by the Abu 
Sayyaf Group? How did the Philippine government respond to Abu Sayyaf’s 
terrorism including its responses to ASG’s use of organizational and operational 
tools? Also, what are the strategies that the government must undertake in order 
to address the ASG threat? 
In answering these central questions, several subsidiary questions emerge 
in the case study of ASG: 
• What were the roles played by the Philippine bureaucracy vis-à-vis 
the national policy to combat terrorism? 
• How did Abu Sayyaf utilize their organizational capabilities 
(ideology, leadership, recruitment) and operational tools (command 
and control, training, weapons, logistics) in the maintenance of 
their terrorist capability? 
• What are the Philippine government capabilities and the 
institutional changes needed in its response to terrorism? 
D.  THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II discusses the Philippine government structure in 
counterterrorism. It examines the roles played by various department and 
agencies in combating the rise of Philippine terrorist radical Islamic groups 
through a range of political, economic, and military means. This chapter also 
8 
focuses on the Philippine counterterrorism policy enunciated by the Macapagal-
Arroyo administration, the interagency coordination and use of intelligence in the 
Philippine bureaucracy, and the role played by the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines. 
Chapter II also provides an overview of the Philippine government 
national policy articulated through the “Fourteen Pillars of Policy and Action 
against Terrorism,” including Memorandum Order number 37 that specifies the 
measures to be undertaken by the Philippine government in international 
cooperation against terrorism.  
Chapter III presents the case study of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). This 
chapter, using Cragin and Daly’s framework on terrorist organizational and 
operational tools, explains Abu Sayyaf’s ideology, leadership, and recruitment. It 
also explains ASG’s operational tools of command and control, training, weapons 
and logistics. This chapter also introduces the reader to ASG’s use of 
organizational and operational tools in the maintenance of their terrorist 
capability. Moreover, this chapter critically examines ASG’s domestic and 
international links and its continuous existence despite the joint Philippine and U. 
S. counterterrorism response against them. 
Chapter IV examines the Philippine government response to terrorism. 
This chapter critically examines the joint Philippines and U. S. counterterrorism 
responses against Abu Sayyaf. It also analyzes the government’s capabilities, the 
needed institutional change, and the weakness of the bureaucracy in its 
response to terrorism. This chapter also mentions the failure of legislation that 
should have been an important aspect in countering terrorism. 
Finally, Chapter V provides a conclusion and outlines policy 
recommendations.  
9 
II.  THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN 
COUNTERTERRORISM 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 forced a paradigm shift in the 
thinking of the Philippine government about national security. As Zachary Abuza 
mentions, “the impact of 9/11 on the Philippines and other Southeast Asian 
governments was enormous, forcing them to confront a radically changed 
security environment.”21  The Philippine government, as a national policy, 
proscribes and abhors violence and terrorism committed by any group, 
regardless of orientation, to attain political or criminal ends.22  It considers 
terrorism a criminal act and shall ensure the speedy investigation and 
prosecution of cases, deportation or extradition of suspects and the suppression 
of activities of public and private entities working as front organizations or aiding 
and abetting terrorism.23  According to William Farrell, “terrorism is not constant; 
it waxes and wanes; and there are several aspects that make counterterrorism 
task difficult.”24  He further argues,  
an effective action by the government in countering hijacking may 
have no effect on reducing the incidents of bombing or kidnapping.  
The government must respond to the many aspects of a problem 
contained under the one label terrorism.25  
                                       
21 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, Crucible of Terror (Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2003), 2. 
22 “National Plan To Address Terrorism and Its Consequences”. Annex K to the Philippine 
National Internal Security Plan (NISP) (2002), 9. 
23 Ibid., 69. 
24 William Regis Farrell, The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism, In Search of An 
Effective Strategy (Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), 69. 
25 Ibid., 69. 
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Under the Philippines’ National Internal Security Plan (NISP),26 the Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG) exemplifies the threat posed by terrorism.  NISP also deals 
with the threats posed by the communist New People’s Army and the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front.  As Steven Rogers contends,  
the Philippine government has the capacity to do so - it controls the 
money, the justice system, and the armed forces - but it lacks the 
will.  Manila’s elites seem reluctant to start a trend that might 
eventually result in restrictions on their own power.27   
This chapter argues that there is a need to enhance the organizational structure 
of the agencies of the Philippine government to address the terrorism posed by 
the Abu Sayyaf Group.  This persistent terrorism of ASG, since its inception 
during the 1990’s, gave the Philippine a lingering bad image of its 
counterterrorism policy. 
Moreover, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the roles played by 
various departments and agencies vis-à-vis the national policy to combat 
terrorism. This chapter also focuses on the Philippines counterterrorism policy, 
the interagency coordination, the intelligence in the bureaucracy, and the role of 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. An understanding of the structure of 
organizations, as channels of policy actions, will aid greatly in comprehending the 
difficulty in countering the serious threat posed by terrorism.28 
B.  COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY 
In responding to the need to maintain security for its people, the 
Philippines under the Macapagal-Arroyo administration, formulated a national 
policy to combat terrorism.  Accordingly, the Philippine government adheres to 
international covenants on terrorism.  As an active member of the United 
                                       
26 National Internal Security Plan (NISP) was based on President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s 
Executive Order No. 21, S- 2001, creating a coordinative and integrative system on international 
security. 
27 Steven Rogers, “Beyond the Abu Sayyaf,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 1 (2004), Pro Quest 
Database (17 March 2004). 
28 Farrell, 2. 
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Nations, it reaffirms its commitment to prevent, suppress and counter all forms 
of terrorist acts in accordance with the UN charter, resolutions or declarations, 
and other relevant international laws.  It shall endeavor to work closely with the 
regional and international community, particularly with the ASEAN, the United 
States and other allies, in order to strengthen the global cooperation to combat 
international terrorism.29 
The Philippine primer defines terrorism, “as the premeditated use or 
threatened use of violence or means of destruction perpetrated against innocent 
civilians or non-combatants, or against civilian and government properties, 
usually intended to influence an audience.”30  Its methods are hostage taking, 
piracy or sabotage, assassination, threats, hoaxes, and indiscriminate bombings 
or shootings.  The primer further mentions that terrorism shall include but be not 
limited to:31 1) hijacking or sabotage of an aircraft, vessel or vehicle; 2) 
kidnapping, detaining without consent, of a person or persons; 3) the use of any 
biological and/or chemical agent, or radioactive material, or nuclear devise, 
explosive, firearm or other weapon, with the intent to endanger, directly or 
indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals, or to cause great damage to 
property; 4) cyber terrorism which includes the unauthorized access to, 
destruction or disruption of government data and finally 5) the act of assisting 
terrorists in any way in the commission of their crime, as an accessory or 
accessories.  
 
                                       
29 “National Plan To Address Terrorism and Its Consequences”. Annex K to the Philippine 
National Internal Security Plan (NISP) (2002), 10. 
30 Philippine Primer on the National Plan to Address Terrorism and Its Consequences (2002), 
2. 
31 Ibid., 2. 
12 
Moreover, the Philippine government national policy is articulated through 
the “Fourteen Pillars of Policy and Action Against Terrorism,”32 to wit: 
1. Supervision and implementation of policies and actions of the 
government against terrorism. 
2. Intelligence coordination 
3. Internal focus against terrorism 
4. Accountability of public and private corporations and personalities 
5. Synchronizing internal efforts with global outlook. 
6. Legal measures 
7. Promotion of Christian and Muslim solidarity 
8. Vigilance against the movement of terrorists and their supporters, 
equipment, weapons and funds. 
9. Contingency plans 
10. Comprehensive security plans for critical infrastructure. 
11. Support of overseas Filipino workers. 
12. Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the 
Philippine National Police. 
13. Media support 
14. Political, social and economic measures 
Memorandum Order number 37 further specifies the following measures 
that shall be undertaken in connection with the government’s commitment to 
cooperate in the international struggle against terrorism:33 
• Join the international counter terrorist coalition and work with the 
United Nations 
• Work closely with the United States on intelligence and security 
matters concerning terrorism; 
• Make available Philippine airspace and facilities if the latter are 
required as transit or staging point; 
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• Contribute logistical support in the form of food supplies, medicine 
and medical personnel;  
• Subject to the concurrence of the Philippine Congress, provide 
combat troops if there is an international call for such troops; and  
• Prevent the flow of funds to terrorist groups in accordance with the 
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 (Philippine Republic Act No. 
9160) and other laws. 
The Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COC - IS)34 has 
been supervising the implementation of all policies and actions of the Philippine 
government against violence and terrorism. The COC–IS handles crisis situations 
at the national level that evolve into national security concerns. The COC–IS 
serves as the Cabinet Crisis Management Committee (CCMC), with the Executive 
Secretary as Chairman. 
The COC-IC has not been proactive in its counterterrorism policy. The 
Bush administration has quietly warned the Philippine government that it has not 
been doing enough to crack down on terrorists groups in the country.35  The 
diplomatic reproach was delivered to President Macapagal-Arroyo on 22 March 
2004 with Australia and Britain joining the warning.36  In spite of the recent 
death of Abu Sayyaff Hamsiraji Sali and five of his men during an encounter with 
Philippine Scout Rangers at Basilan Island on 08 April 2004, there is still a high 
level of tension for a possible terrorist attack.  The warning the Americans 
delivered to the Philippines is similar to the one delivered to the Indonesian 
government weeks before the attacks in Bali in October 2002.37  
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C. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION 
Critical to the implementation of the National Plan to address terrorism is 
the effective and efficient integration of efforts and responses of the entire 
government machinery.  There is a need for interagency coordination between 
the different departments and agencies that requires identifying areas of 
exclusivity, coordination, and integration to ensure a unity of efforts.  The 
Department of National Defense (DND) and the Department of Interior and Local 
Government (DILG), along with the Departments of Energy, Transportation and 
Communication, and Justice, should forge the vital link with the National Security 
Adviser (NSA) Office to mount an efficient collective effort against terrorism.  
According to Lynn Davis, “coordination is a word more used than understood in 
government.”38  Davis contends that “if decisions or actions are left to individual 
departments operating separately, there will be a risk of mistakes, lost 
opportunities, policies at odds with another or actions that diverge from the 
President’s goal’s.”39  The most significant examples are the government 
incompetence in handling the Abu Sayyaf’s “Sipadan hostage-taking” on 23 April 
2000 and the “Dos Palmas kidnap-for-ransom” incidents on 28 May 2001.  
Captain Ruben Guinolbay, company commander of the Philippine Army’s elite 
scout rangers, related in a public hearing at Congress how his unit was ordered 
into bandit-infested Basilan on short notice but was not given its proper 
complement of heavy weaponry.40  The House Committee on Defense has 
investigated the allegations that military officers had saved the Abu Sayyaf 
kidnappers, who were holding 18 Filipino and American hostages, from certain 
annihilation.41  
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On the other hand, Nathan White argues, “even if agencies choose not to 
develop aggressive counterterrorist intelligence systems, officers will still be 
called to terrorist scenes as first responders.”42  The nature of terrorism in the 
Philippines forced the local police and area military forces to participate if the 
terrorist acts occur in their area of responsibility.  When reinforcement or other 
agencies arrive on the scene, they will still coordinate or interact with a host of 
other units.  
As an immediate response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Philippine 
government adopted a two-pronged approach in addressing terrorism and its 
consequences management.  The first approach is crisis management that 
pertains to activities occurring while a terrorist incident is taking place, while the 
second approach is consequence management that refers to managing the event 
after a terrorist attack has occurred. According to NPTC,43 “success in 
preventing, preparing for and responding to terrorist attacks will depend upon 
the establishment and maintenance of a coordinated crisis and consequence 
management infrastructures.” NPTC further mentions that the roles of 
participating agencies are defined and their efforts synchronized in each of the 
stages of the phases of crisis management and consequence management.  
Close coordination among the different agencies involved is enjoined to achieve 
synergy, and the overlap provides the opportunity to develop interoperability 
among the various agencies of government addressing the terrorist threat.  The 
level of intervention of the police and military in any of the stages is determined 
by the degree of the terrorist threat that develops. Accordingly, the police and 
military take the lead role when the situation requires armed intervention.  
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Afterwards, the police and military revert to their supporting roles when the crisis 
is resolved and post action activities are undertaken to restore normalcy and 
bring those responsible to court.44 
The Philippines followed the COC-IS organizational structure and became 
effective, mostly in natural disasters coordination. The COC-IS (Cabinet 
Oversight Committee on Internal Security) that handles crisis or counterterrorism 
situations at the national level also handles the National Peace and Order Council 
(NPOS).  The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government (SILG) chairs the 
NPOC with the Secretary of National Defense (SND); the Secretary of 
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and the Secretary of 
Department of Justice (DOJ); the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines; the Chief of the Philippine National Police; and private sector 
representative as members. 
According to Nathan White, in early 2001, the U.S. Federal Government 
developed an Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan 
(CONPLAN) with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the lead agency. It 
involves a system of responses of six federal agencies to domestic terrorism.  By 
coordinating the response of its major agencies, the federal government hopes 
to interact effectively with state and local governments after a terrorist attack.45 
White also explains that, “the federal government originally divided its 
defensive approach into crisis management and consequence management, but 
a bipartisan committee on national security mentions that the federal 
government is spending too much time looking at the difference between crisis 
and consequence management.”46  The bipartisan committee also argues that 
law enforcement should have the lead role in the initial stages of consequence 
management time. The Bush administration ended the dichotomy between the 
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crisis and consequence management with the signing of Homeland Security Act 
approach on November 25, 2002.47  This approach seeks to escape the problem 
of interagency coordination by concentrating terrorism missions in a single 
agency.48 The Macapagal-Arroyo administration still uses the crisis and 
consequence management approach in its counterterrorism through the NPTC 
(National Plan to Address Terrorism and its Consequences).49 
On the other hand, Paul Pillar argues “no single approach makes an 
effective counterterrorist policy, and terrorism can be addressed by solving root 
conditions, capabilities of terrorists, intentions or motives of terrorist groups, and 
defenses against attacks.”50  The United States’ four approaches to managing 
terrorism are all failed approaches: the Clinton administration command and 
control approach; the lead agency approach; the Department of Homeland and 
Security approach; and the appointment of a White House coordinator or czar.51 
Relating these four models to the Philippine situation seems difficult. 
Although the Philippine government has been using the “lead agency approach”, 
the other three (3) approaches might not be effective in the Philippine setting 
unless there is an improvement in the bureaucracy and political institutions.  
According to Zachary Abuza,  
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most Southeast Asian states are weak, characterized by weak 
political institutions, decentralized politics, poor resources, and 
plagued by endemic corruption.  The lack of strong central 
government control has always attracted Al-Qaida.52  
Like other Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines is a country of convenience, 
which makes it attractive to terrorist groups who rely on the same infrastructure 
used by transnational criminals.53  The countries and institutions in Southeast 
Asia are so fractionalized and cannot even decide on a common agenda within 
their borders, as such Philippine public officials deny the scope of the terrorist 
threat despite the intelligence services gathering the information.54  Abuza also 
mentions that security in weak states is plagued by endemic corruption and 
rivalry occurs between the army and police forces over turf and illegal business 
empires. Most police and militaries in Southeast Asia rely on extra-budgetary 
sources of income to finance their operations.55  Another problem pertains to the 
porous borders of the Philippine archipelago including the ineffective immigration 
and visa procedures in which the lack of a computerized immigration database 
facilitates an easy change of identities for would be terrorists.  It would be a 
challenge to coordinate and implement the counterterrorism policy operationally 
because the existing capabilities of governmental structure fall far short of what 
is needed. 
D.  INTELLIGENCE IN THE BUREAUCRACY 
The success in combating terrorism is predicated on the availability of 
timely and accurate intelligence.  One approach to assuring timely information in 
combating terrorism involves conventional human and technical intelligence 
capabilities that penetrate terrorist groups and their support systems.  An equally 
important approach is through investigative police efforts.  Collecting tactical 
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police intelligence aids in monitoring terrorists’ activities and may be crucial to 
tracking terrorist bands.  The national intelligence effort relies on collection and 
liaison arrangements that exist also with many friendly governments. 
Long-term intelligence programs to combat terrorism involve the collection 
and analysis of data that address history, culture, religion, politics, psychology, 
and security conditions.  The requirement for accurate analysis applies both to 
long-term threat assessments and to support incident management.  All 
terrorism-related intelligence collection and analysis must be directed toward the 
production and dissemination of clear, concise, and accurate threat warnings and 
assessments to decision makers in time for them to take the necessary action. 
The Philippine Intelligence Community was shaken by accusations of 
“failure” to predict the strategy, tactics and movements of the Abu Sayyaf Group.  
Whether this accusation was warranted is debatable; what is important is that 
the intelligence community cannot afford to waste time in the collection, analysis 
and dissemination of information and intelligence regarding the Abu Sayyaf and 
other threats to national security.  The intelligence units of the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National Bureau of 
Investigation (NBI) and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) 
play important roles in the counterterrorism efforts of the Philippine government. 
According to Campbell and Flournoy, “intelligence enables all other 
components of the campaign against terrorism to be effective, from homeland 
security to law enforcement military and covert operations, and coalition 
building.”56  Policymakers rely on processed and analyzed information given by 
the intelligence community.  Policy makers have a constant need for tailored, 
timely intelligence that will provide background, context, information, warning, 
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and an assessment of risks, benefits, and likely outcomes.57  As Lowenthal 
mentions, “There is a strict dividing line between intelligence and policy; the 
government is run by and for the policymakers and intelligence has a support 
role and may not cross over into the advocacy of policy choices.”58 
Corollary to this is the Philippine’s National Security Council (NSC), which 
is the principal adviser of the president pertaining to intelligence and security 
issues. It assists the president in analyzing and integrating the national security 
policy and strategy.  Intelligence, ideally, from AFP, PNP, NBI, and NICA goes to 
the NSC.  However, Philippine bureaucracy presents no exception to modern 
organizational theories.  It seems simple that defense and intelligence 
communities gather information concerning possible terrorist activities in the 
Philippines.  The NBI, NICA, AFP, and PNP are all tasked as the agencies 
responsible for domestic terrorism. The NBI, as with NICA and AFP, are loosely 
linked to the Philippine National Police.  The different intelligence agencies 
regularly meet at the national level and the regional level’s RICC (Regional 
Intelligence Coordinating Committee),59 and it would seem that intelligence could 
be readily shared on a need-to-know basis. However, interagency rivalries, laws, 
and turf protection reduces the possibility of shared information.  According to 
White, “police executives are fiercely autonomous, and law enforcement 
agencies and intelligence bureaus rarely trust one another.”60  White contends 
that “intelligence agencies collect information for defense of the country while 
the police agencies collect information for prosecution, and the real difference is 
not based on bureaucratic rivalries but differences based on the constitutional 
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use of government power.”61  Stated simply, the police are reluctant to share 
information inside and outside their organizations.  This attitude has a negative 
impact on all criminal investigations, and the effects spill over into 
counterterrorism.62  The intelligence services in Southeast Asia are often overly 
politicized and engaged in fierce bureaucratic infighting when confronting 
organized crime, human and drug smuggling and money laundering.63  Most 
Filipino case officers keep their own files and do not necessarily share them with 
others outside their units, and there is no single central data bank.64  The main 
problem of this war on terror is the inability of law-enforcement officials and 
investigators on the ground to share their information with one another and with 
other nations.”65  The intelligence agents are not only fighting to uncover 
information about terrorist networks, but often have to fight, at a great personal 
risk, to get their information passed up the chain of command, and struggle even 
harder to get the politicians to act on it.66 
Intelligence coordination is particularly important in decisions to warn the 
public about the threat level, and once the government has decided to issue the 
warning, it is hard to know when the threat is over since no standard exists by 
which to judge, and often, no intelligence exists to confirm that the threat has 
passed.67  Philippine intelligence has no higher task than to solve all the puzzling 
information about terrorist threats.  The government must swiftly identify and 
prioritize shortfalls not only to end the Abu Sayyaf threat but other terrorist 
threats as well.  It is essential to undertake a comprehensive plan and 
restructuring of the intelligence community to deal effectively with the new 
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terrorism.  It is also imperative to handle overlapping missions and functions of 
the Philippine intelligence agencies accordingly.  The shortfalls in intelligence 
sharing, intelligence databases, collection efforts, intelligence fusion and human 
intelligence should be solved immediately. These shortfalls must have a plan of 
action that should address policy, people, processes or technology in order to 
combat terrorism in the years to come.   
E.  MILITARY STRUCTURE AND ITS CAPABILITIES 
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), although a part of the 
executive branch, has been likened by many political scientists to another branch 
of the Philippine government.68  This large armed services bureaucracy, 
composed of the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force, was conceived primarily for 
internal security, and lacks the modern equipment that its neighboring countries’ 
military services have to combat external threats.69  The defense program of the 
Philippines is to overcome primarily the acute equipment obsolescence resulting 
partly, if not entirely, from the country’s total dependence on the United States 
for protection when the U.S. bases were still in the Philippines.70 
According to Paul Pillar, “military force along with diplomacy, criminal 
justice system, interdiction of financial assets, and intelligence are 
counterterrorism instruments of statecraft.”71  In addition, a military instrument, 
like diplomacy is a function of economic development.  Government’s capability 
to acquire sophisticated military arsenal and build a strong and capable armed 
forces depends on the country’s economic status.72  As in other countries, the 
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Philippine military has been the primary instrument in the fight against terrorism.  
As Jonathan White mentions, “the assumption behind the use of military force is 
a belief that the terrorist problem has become too great for the state’s civil 
power.”73  He further argues, “when military forces are employed, governments 
feel that civilian police forces and the courts are no longer capable of dealing 
with violence.”74  This is the case when the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP), who augmented the Philippine National Police in fighting the Abu Sayyaf, 
have grown too strong.  One salient feature of the AFP Internal Security 
Operation (ISO) Plan “Bantay Laya” pertains to the continuous conduct of ISO 
nationwide to destroy the Abu Sayyaf at the earliest possible moment and 
decisively defeat the New Peoples Army and Moro Islamic Liberation Front.75  
This ISO mission originally belonged to the PNP but was given to the AFP during 
the later part of the Ramos administration.  As Pillar explains, “military force 
should continue to be available as a counterterrorist instrument because it is a 
form of power with a clear advantage, and in some situations it will be the only 
way to respond publicly and emphatically to a terrorist outrage.”76  The AFP’s 
crackdown in 2000 at Camp Abubakar, a sprawling complex run by the MILF for 
al-Qaeda and its associate groups such as the Abu Sayyaf, is the only way to 
respond to terrorism perpetrated by Abu Sayyaf at Mindanao.  Lieutenant 
General Voltaire Gazmin in his book, The Fall of Abubakar, explains that “Camp 
Abubakar” is vaunted as the enemy’s fortress and would have been a national 
shame and dishonor had the government failed to crush and dismantle its myth. 
On the other hand, Booth and Dunne argue “the pursuit of military 
solution faces many obstacles especially when victory is defined broadly as a 
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series of decisive actions against terrorist organizations.”77  The duo further 
contends, “choosing war fighting rather than crime fighting risked reproducing 
the logic of the terrorists that war is the only prevailing way.”78  According to 
Jonathan White, there are “four factors at the heart of controversy over military 
counterterrorist activities: 1) civil governments aversion to use military force to 
ensure domestic peace; 2) the overreaction on the part of military force; 3) 
military power deters terrorism or creates more terrorism; 4) the questions on 
the proper use of force by military.”79  This means that function of the military is 
not to enforce civil law, and it is the police that should enforce civil law.  White 
also contends, “the use of military force to augment police power creates 
repression and more terrorism due to excess use of force against the 
terrorists.”80 
However, Campbell and Flournoy still argue that, “the military is an 
instrument of national power that should be used to protect and advance a 
broad range of a country’s national interest.”  The duo further explains, “every 
potential military operation will have to be assessed not only in terms of 
immediate costs and benefits but also in the context of its likely impact on the 
ability to achieve long–term goals of the campaign.”81  The AFP and U.S. Armed 
Forces operations against Abu Sayyaf were successful in dismantling the 
organization, but the Abu Sayyaf still is far from being defeated.  As Abuza 
mentions, “like the Al-Qaida organizations, it is a fluid organization with uncanny  
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ability to recruit, indoctrinate, and reconstitute itself, and South East Asia 
including the Philippines will be an important theater of operation for it in the 
coming years.”82 
Although Admiral Thomas Fargo mentions that the Philippines is a strong 
partner both globally and regionally in the War on Terrorism,83 the Philippine 
government should still address the AFP’s capability shortfalls.  Military 
capabilities on intelligence, mobility, firepower, communications and 
interoperability including command and control between the three armed 
services of the Army, Navy and Air Force, are critical to the counterterrorism 
campaign.  The department of National Defense (DND) should undertake an 
“honest to goodness” assessment of the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ 
capabilities required to support the campaign against terrorism.  This requires 
organizational and structural arrangements for the AFP including innovative 
operational concepts and advanced systems.  As Maria Ressa argues, “despite all 
allegations against the Philippine military, many Filipino soldiers display courage, 
persistence, and idealism.  They work for little pay with patchy support in terms 
of personnel, and they are saddled with often antiquated equipment.”84  Fighting 
transnational crimes, insurgency, and terrorism require rethinking of the AFP’s 
capabilities, operational concepts, organizations, and ways of cooperating with 
other key actors in the campaign. 
F.  CONCLUSION 
The Philippines have tried in the past, with only modest success, to 
combat the rise of terrorist radical Islamic groups through a range of political, 
economic and military means. The Philippine government structure and its 
instrumentalities have a vital role to play in the campaign against terrorism. The 
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campaign requires a thorough analysis and assessment of the Philippine 
Counterterrorism Policy, the inter-agency coordination, intelligence sharing, and 
improved and enhanced military structure and capabilities.  Finally, the war on 
terrorism will become the nation’s number one national security policy on the 
resurgence of terrorist activities of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the 
Communist Party of the Philippines.  The Abu Sayyaf threat has been diminished 
modestly but not completely.  The Philippine government must forge an effective 
national strategy comprising of the proper social, economic, political, and military 
elements. 
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III. CASE STUDY: THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
What makes Southeast Asia such fertile ground for Al Qaeda is its large 
Muslim population within a political landscape that is much more open and 
fractured than the Arab Middle East.85  Due to its large Muslim population, the 
Southeast Asian sub-region of the Asia-Pacific has received the most attention 
from Western officials and analysts following the ouster of the Taliban regime by 
the U.S.-led Coalition at the end of 2001.86  This large Muslim population in 
Indonesia and Southern Philippines, such as Basilan, as well as Sulawesi and 
Maluku, has difficult-to-police maritime boundaries and may prove to be potential 
lawless regions for terrorist cells or groups to breed.87  The emergence of 
internationally linked terrorist cells in Southeast Asia is a surprise to its 
government officials who were blinded by cognitive consistency and 
complacency.88  The governments and security analysts ignored the fact that a 
number of hardcore militants, who espoused the use of violence to establish a 
pan-Islamic state, had taken root in the region.89  The porous borders, “hawala” 
system or money laundering including Islamic charities attracted Al Qaeda to the 
region.  The extremists were able to develop closer financial political and 
financial links with militants, arm suppliers, drug dealers, and other shadowy 
forces.  The mix of socioeconomic marginalization, loosening political controls 
and vanishing borders has created a time bomb in the region.90  As Abuza 
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mentions, “Southeast Asia has long been a center for transnational criminal 
activity: not only money laundering, but also drug and gun running, people 
smuggling, and document forging.”91  While terrorism differs from a 
transnational crime that has no profit motive, terrorists require a similar 
infrastructure.  The lack of a strong central government in Southeast Asia, 
particularly Indonesia and Philippines, has always attracted Al Qaeda.92 
In the period since 9/11, efforts by law enforcement and intelligence 
organizations have revealed much that was previously unknown about these 
organizations, which fall into three types:93 (1) international terrorist groups such 
as Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) whose agenda includes attacks on U.S. 
interests and the establishment of pan-Islamic “caliphate;” (2) social extremists 
such as Laskar Jihad in Indonesia that accept the existing national state but 
attack non-Muslim elements within it; (3) traditional Muslim separatists such as 
the MILF in the Southern Philippines that seek a separate Muslim state.  The 
picture is greatly complicated by linkages between groups including JI and Al 
Qaeda, between Abu Sayyaf and Al Qaeda, and between JI and MILF.  Further 
complications arise from links between elements of the Indonesian military and 
JI, and other similar groups.  In short, the wiring diagram for terrorism in 
Southeast Asia would depict interactive networks with multiple agendas.94 
Islam in the Philippines has been a source of separatist insurgency for 
decades, and the Philippine government has not managed it successfully over 
that time.95  McKenna contends that the struggle for Muslim separatism in the 
Philippines exemplifies the political complexities found in similar political 
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movements in post-colonial situations and it is possible to trace the remote 
causes of Muslim separatism in the Philippines to Western colonizers.  The 
American colonial rulers encouraged the development of a self-conscious 
Philippine Muslim identity among a generation of educated Muslim elites who 
were divided by linguistic, geographic, and cultural barriers.96  This Islamic 
consciousness intensities and the strengthening of ethno religious identities 
culminated in an Islamic insurgency against the Philippine state.97  The United 
States was able to contain this insurgency but never eliminate it.98  Abuza 
explains that the Philippines has a 400-year-old secessionist movement in the 
southern islands around Mindanao led by an aggrieved Muslim minority.  The 
Muslim-dominated territory includes western Mindanao, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and 
the Sulu Archipelago.  Today, 13 of the country’s 67 provinces have significant, if 
not majority, Muslim populations.99  In the majority-Catholic Philippines, the 
heavily Muslim southern island of Mindanao has 15 of the country’s poorest 
provinces with the lowest life expectancy.100  As Li and Schaub mention, 
“primary cause of transnational terrorism is underdevelopment and poverty, an 
argument that recently became popular among but was rarely formalized by 
policy makers and scholars.”101  Poor economic conditions create “terrorist 
breeding grounds,” where disaffected populations turn to transnational terrorist 
activities as a solution to their problems.102  Kurlantzick also argues that the 
economic and political desperation of these areas has fostered the hatred that  
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bred separatist and splinter organizations willing to use terrorist tactics to 
achieve their goals.  Abu Sayyaf, the Uighur rebels, Free Aceh separatists, and 
the Malaysian Islamic sect Al Ma’unah are a few examples of this trend.103 
The security problems in Mindanao pertains to the Muslim secessionists 
and separatist movements led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
during the early 1970’s, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) since the 
late 1980’s, as well as the more radical Abu Sayyaf in the past decade. 
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), originally known as the Mujahideen 
Commando Freedom Fighters, was first thought of as nothing more than a local 
(provincial) version of the MNLF and/or MILF, a breakaway faction of the former 
movement.104  However, the ASG is the violent offshoot of the MNLF whose 
chilling name means “bearer of the sword,” and has raided resorts, taken tourists 
hostage, captured Christian villages and slit the throats of residents, and 
allegedly blown up Manila shopping centers.105 
This chapter, using Cragin and Daly’s framework on terrorist 
organizational and operational tools, argues that Abu Sayyaf’s organizational 
capabilities: ideology, leadership, and recruitment sustain its cohesion and 
existence.  The operational tools of command and control, training, weapons and 
logistics provide the necessary sustaining capability against offensives by 
government forces.  The key to Abu Sayyaf’s survival has been its ability to adapt 
to its environment in Basilan, Sulu, and Central Mindanao.  It exists where 
resistance to the state is deeply embedded and where the government is weak in 
places where ASG operates.  This chapter also introduces the reader to Abu 
Sayyaf’s use of organizational and operational tools in the maintenance of their 
terrorist capability.   
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Moreover, this chapter critically examines Abu Sayyaf’s domestic and 
international links and its continuous existence despite the joint Philippines and 
U.S. counter terrorism response against them. 
B.   IDEOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES 
1.  Ideology 
With regards to terrorism, the term ideology means the consensus of 
grievances and objectives that a terrorist group is trying to address through 
violence.106  The terrorists’ ideologies may take on many forms, e.g., religious or 
political, but still has the same purpose of motivating actions, unifying members, 
and linking the organization to communities for which it purports to fight.107  
Ranstorp contends that religious fanaticism is a principal motivation for terrorism, 
and asserts that followers of various faiths, such as Islam, Judaism, and 
Japanese cults, are often led to perform terrorist acts.  He argues that religious 
terrorism is a type of political violence that is motivated by a sense of spiritual 
crisis and a reaction to social and political changes.108 
The Abu Sayyaf Group first emerged in 1989 under the leadership of 
Abdujarak Janjalani, the son of a fisherman on Basilan Island, who had become 
connected with a Muslim fundamentalist movement, Al Islamic Tabligh, in the 
1980’s.109  The group under him is committed to the establishment of an 
exclusive, independent Islamic Theocratic State of Mindanao (MIS), and is 
infused with a highly intolerant religious credo that calls for the deliberate and 
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systematic targeting of all southern Filipino Christians.110  In the pursuit of this 
objective, the ASG has explicitly defined its ideological and operational agenda as 
intimately tied to an integrated effort aimed at asserting the global dominance of 
Islam through armed struggle.111  The ASG, the smallest and most radical of the 
Islamic separatist groups in the southern Philippines, engages in bombings, 
assassinations, kidnappings, and extortion to promote an independent Islamic 
state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the Southern 
Philippines heavily populated by Muslims.112  However, Bandow argues, “the 
group operates more like criminals than terrorists and are usually satisfied by 
collecting ransom – about $20 million in 2000.”113  As Gracia Burnham would 
later say, despite all the talk of religion, their motivation was simple: “the bottom 
line was money.”114  While there have been signs of an internal rupturing of the 
ASG along criminal lines since the 1998 death of its radically fundamentalist 
founder, Janjalani, the group continues to exhibit a strong identification with the 
goals and rhetoric of global Islamic extremism.115  The string of Western 
kidnappings staged by the group in 2000, for instance, while undoubtedly 
motivated by financial imperatives, were also aimed at securing the release of 
Ramzi Yousef, Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman (similarly convicted for the 1993 World 
Trade Centre bombing) and other Muslims imprisoned in the United States on 
terrorist charges.116  On the other hand, Byman argues that ethnic terrorism 
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differs from terrorism executed in the name of ideology, religion, or economic 
gain.117  He acknowledges the growing influence of religion on terrorism, but he 
believes ethnic terrorism is a unique entity, even though the line between ethnic 
and religious violence is blurred.  Ethnic terrorists are usually more nationalistic 
and more easily forge a national identity than their religious counterparts.  
Accordingly, White uses evidence from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LITE), the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA), and the Basque National and Liberty (ETA) as evidence of ethnic 
terrorism.118  Violence plays a special role in ethnic terrorism.  Whereas political 
terrorists use violence in a symbolic manner and religious extremists use it to 
make a theological statement, violence is the raison d’être of ethnic terrorism.  It 
keeps an idea alive.  As long as a bomb goes off or a police officer is murdered, 
it is not possible to deny the identity and existence of ethnic differences.  
However, in the Philippines, Ressa argues, “there are separatist groups that are 
often lumped together but in fact can vary from mafia-like shakedown artists to 
true Muslim extremists.”119  Moreover, violence sustains the conflict, even when 
political objectives are far out of reach.  The fear created by violence serves 
ethnic interests and violence and also serves to undermine moderates who seek 
peaceful solutions.  Political terrorists direct fear toward an external audience in 
the hopes of creating an illusion that the government’s sociopolitical structure 
cannot work.120  The Abu Sayyaf succeeded in capturing the world’s attention by 
hostaging not just the people but also the government.  During the five-month 
Sipadan hostage drama that started on 23 April 2000, it dictated terms to the 
Philippine government, and after the ransom was paid, the Abu Sayyaf 
contributed more to the local economy than any government program.121 
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2.  Leadership 
A typical contemporary terrorist infrastructure is centrifugal resembling a 
solar system: the leader is the sun, and the members are surrounding planets, 
usually within the range of his direct impact.122  Zawondy mentions that in the 
hierarchical system, the leader is at the top while in the centrifugal system the 
leader is at the center.  The leaders of terrorist movements, by virtue of being in 
the center of organizations, not only act as direct catalysts for actions, by 
planning and giving orders, but they are also participants in the actions.123  On 
the other hand, Cragin and Daly’s research shows that leadership is significantly 
more complex and argue that the leadership’s role in maintaining group cohesion 
depends as much on the structure of the organization as it does on one leader’s 
charisma.124 
The emergence of Abu Sayyaf in the early 1990’s represented the 
radicalization of the Muslim separatist movement headed by Abdurajak Janjalani, 
who was a veteran of the Afghan war.  He fought with a mujahideen group 
under Abdul Rasul Abu Sayyaf.125  When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan 
in 1989, Abdujarak returned to Basilan and established the Al Harakut al-Islamiya 
or the Islamic movement known as Abu Sayyaf with younger MNLF cadres 
opposed to MNLF’s policy of negotiation.126  Abdurajak Janjalani established the 
ASG as a breakaway faction of the Moro National Liberation Front, which was a 
nationalist insurgent group engaged in guerilla warfare against the Philippine 
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government since the 1960’s.127  By all accounts of charismatic personality, 
Abdujarak attracted to his movement young Muslims returning from Islamic 
studies in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan and Egypt, as well as local militants.128  
In comparison to the SL or Hizballah, the ASG has maintained a smaller 
membership, approximately 500 members at the height of its strength in the late 
1990’s.129  Between 1991 and 1998, the militant group began to expand and 
develop its capabilities, moving from a group able to conduct a small attack to 
successfully targeting foreign nationals.  In the first years of the ASG campaign, 
the group mostly kidnapped local residents, and their level of capability was 
sustained because many of its members were drawn from the pools of 
disgruntled MNLF or MILF fighters.130  In 1998, Abdurajak Janjalani died during a 
shootout with the military and police in Lamitan, Basilan, taking with him so 
much of the ideological glue of fundamentalism, which gave a political and moral 
cause to his group.131  Janjalani’s death devastated the group as he had played 
a key role in maintaining the ASG’s cohesion, strategy, and tactics.132  The 
leadership change splintered the ASG into as many as five distinct subgroups, 
each with a separate leadership agenda, and over the next few years, would 
become gangsters known for their viciousness and brutal beheadings.133  Like 
the MNLF, the ASG is also factionalized.  Khadafi Janjalani, trained in Libya and 
brother of slain founder Abdurajak Janjalani, is heading the fundamentalist 
resistant movement in Basilan, and recently captured Galib Andang, alias 
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Commander Robot, used to head the faction operating in Jolo.134  In addition to 
changes within the group’s internal structure, external support to the ASG 
declined temporarily due to its uncertain future and increased focus on 
conducting largely criminal acts, such as taking hostages for ransom, which had 
little to do with the broader ideological aims of ASG’s supporters.135 
3.  Recruitment 
Terrorism is motivated by a range of real and perceived injustice that 
spans virtually every facet of human activity.  The resulting grievances provide 
the basis for recruitment and the terrorists’ justification for violence.136  
Recruitment pools are one of the most important requirements for terrorist 
groups’ survivability.  Groups need new members both to grow in strength and 
to replenish losses and defections.137  According to Kurlantzick, in the 
Philippines, Japan, and other democratic Asian countries, terrorist have utilized 
the freedom given to nongovernmental organizations to set up front companies, 
usually “charities”, that launder money, procure weapons, and recruit fighters.138  
Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, established IIRO 
(Islamic International Relief Organization) in the Philippines in 1988, ostensibly 
for charity and religious work but channeled money to extremist groups including 
Saudi MERC (Medical Emergency Relief Charity) International, Islamic Wisdom 
Worldwide Mission (IWWM), Daw’l Imman Al Shafec Center, and the 
International Relations and Information Center (IRIC).139  Although most of the  
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money goes to legitimate charitable work, albeit to win political support, such as 
mosque construction, charities, cultural centers, and NGOs, a significant amount 
is diverted to terrorist and paramilitary activities.140 
The original goal of Abu Sayyaf was an independent theocratic state in the 
southern Philippines, but unlike the MNLF and the MILF, the group saw its 
national objective as tied to a global effort to assert the dominance of Islam 
through armed struggle.  Abdurajak had developed strong links to radicals in 
Afghanistan, including bin Laden and Khalifa, who helped established Abu 
Sayyaf.141  Although, Osama bin Laden apparently remains al Qaedas’ ideological 
and inspirational leader, the organization’s affiliated groups still rely on their 
various leaders to maintain unity within al Qaeda, such as MILF and ASG who 
recruit members and conduct attacks without oversight from Al Qaeda.142  
According to Young, in June 2001, the Abu Sayyaf offered a high-powered rifle 
for a new recruit and 50,000 pesos ($1,000) in monthly pay to beef up its forces 
on Basilan Island.143  The pay was taken from the ransom given by the freed 
hostages, and the allure of easy money and adventure is a powerful incentive in 
Basilan144 and other depressed Muslim regions in Mindanao.145  On 02 April  
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2004, Khadafi Janjalani, in an interview with the Inquirer, mentions that he had 
many volunteers willing to undergo training on use of explosives and explains 
that training had been going on since 2002.146 
Moreover, San Juan argues that Abu Sayyaf is a splinter group born out of 
the U.S. war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and subsequently used by 
the Philippine government to sow discord among the more militant Islamic 
organizations.147  Protected by local politicians and military officials as well as 
local peasants, the Abu Sayyaf persistence betokens the complicated history of 
the struggle of Muslims in the Philippines for justice and self-determination 
dating back from the advent of the Spanish conquistadors in the mid-16th 
century.148  Moreover, Takeyh and Gvosdev explain that failed states create 
pools of recruits and supporters for terrorist groups, who can use their resources 
and organizations to step into the vacuum left by the collapse of official state 
power and civil society.149  Failed states provide the opportunity for terrorist 
organizations to acquire territory on a scale much larger than a collection of 
scattered safe houses, enough to accommodate entire training complexes, arm 
depots, and communications facilities.150  This has been the case of Abu Sayyaf 
and its nexus with MILF where they acquired de facto control over specified 
areas in Mindanao.  By playing on the widespread grievances on corruption, 
economic disparities and political repression, the ASG and even the MILF have 
discovered new recruits and used the rural and mountainous areas of Mindanao 
to create a safe haven for training recruits.  As Turner argues, “ASG members  
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are recruited from a restricted community determined by ethno-linguistic group 
and family where internal coordination is facilitated by trust.”  This makes the 
organization virtually impossible to penetrate by government agents.151  
4.  ASG’s Use of Media 
The ASG has effectively used the media and other modern 
communications technology to project themselves and their terror into civil 
society’s consciousness.152  The Abu Sayyaf saw the media’s role in conveying 
their messages worldwide as essential to achieving their goals.  They knew that 
their acts were newsworthy.  According to Debatin, “the terrorist outrages have 
been planned and timed so as to exploit the media to its absolute limits and to 
attract maximum publicity.”153  Terrorists show no hesitation or lack of skill in 
exploiting the benefits of democracy.154  On the other hand, San Juan mentions 
that the Abu Sayyaf bandit group of less than 100 men has been elevated to 
incredible prominence by the U.S. media.155  Likewise, Pekka Mykannen 
mentions that media is very responsible for letting Abu Sayyaf understand what 
kind of money there is in Western countries.156  Foreign journalists paid 
significant sums for access to the terrorists that hindered both the release of the 
terrorists and the process of negotiations.157  The Abu Sayyaf charged journalists 
access to the camps including interviews with them and the hostages.  Other 
journalists paid $500 to $1,000, but on 03 June 2000, 10 western journalists paid 
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$25,000 to Abu Sayyaf.  As Pekka mentions, “media was basically arming them 
and making them stronger in order to get very important information about the 
condition of the hostages.”158  As a result of the publicity, Abu Sayyaf was able 
to get their messages out to various audiences: the ASG supporters, military and 
police, Muslim supporters, local and international observers.  Likewise, family 
members of the hostages turned to the media who then brought pressure on the 
Philippine government to take action that may not be appropriate or possible.  
Lastly, the media was also able to portray ASG’s asymmetrical warfare of 
irrational barbarism and profits from ransom.  However, the real dangers, 
according to Debatin, “lies in the possibility that the media – known for their 
incorruptible search for the truth and their critical approach to government action 
– may find themselves in a situation where lines are blurred between coverage 
and propaganda.”159  
C.   OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
1.  Command and Control 
Command and control is the mechanism that terrorist groups use to plan, 
coordinate, and execute their attacks.160  The terrorist groups not only sustain 
the activities of their command and control network but also protect it from 
infiltration.161  Ressa mentions that one of the nine jungle network camps of ASG 
is Camp Abdurajak, the central base camp about 20x40 miles and so well hidden 
that Red Cross workers who have been to the base camp say it is virtually 
impenetrable.162  It would eventually be overrun by troops, but in those early 
days, the Abu Sayyaf was confident of its position, and some of their demands 
became preposterous.163  Said ASG camps were reportedly a major planning hub 
for their missions.  Moreover, radical Islamic Filipinos returning from training 
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camps in Afghanistan in the early 1990’s had little difficulty infiltrating the 
Southern Philippines.  Abu Sayyaf has well-established ties with Al Qaeda and 
has constructed training camps in the southern Philippines modeled on the Al 
Qaeda setup in Afghanistan.164  The Abu Sayyaf’s command and control 
requirement in the early 1990’s were minimal.  The group relied on couriers or 
runners to coordinate operations.  However, as Desker mentions, ASG is flush 
with ransom money with which to purchase new weapons and equipment, such 
as state-of-the-art speedboats and advanced communication devices.165  Abu 
Sayyaf had better command and control equipment resulting from its many 
lucrative kidnapping operations.  An example pertains to Libya’s $20 million 
payment to secure the release of hostages in 2000.  Vitug and Gloria contends 
that ASG rebels-turned-bandits have become power centers of their own network 
of informants that extend to the Sulu and Basilan islands, keep their own money-
making schemes such as kidnapping, and get away with them due to their 
dalliances with corrupt police and military men.166  Thus, ASG was able to 
operate and plan attacks with little concern for their own security.  They likewise 
meticulously plan their attacks in order to make a big impact. 
2.  Weapons and Logistics 
In late September 2001, the Philippine military’s Chief of Staff confirmed 
speculation that an Al-Qaeda was seeking to support the Abu Sayyaf with 
material, leadership, and training support.167  As a transnational terrorist 
organization, Al Qaeda has sought to expand beyond the traditional venue of the 
Middle East, Western Europe, North America, and South Asia.  Increasingly, the 
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organization has pursued Southeast Asia as a key basing and staging region.  Al 
Qaeda has long cultivated links with groups such as the Abu Sayyaf, MILF, and 
Indonesian group Laskar Jihad.168  As in the Southern Philippines, Al Qaeda has 
developed the ability to merge with the religious, social, and economic life of the 
Muslim communities.  Bin Laden clearly saw the potential of a jihad in the 
southern Philippines, and in 1998, sent his brother-in-law, Mohammed Jamal 
Khalifa, to establish several Islamic charities and to channel funding to Muslim 
insurgents and terrorist cells.169  The Islamic International Relief Organization 
(IIRO) was used by bin Laden and Khalifa to distribute funds for the purchase of 
arms and other logistical requirements of the Abu Sayyaf and MILF, and only 30 
percent goes to legitimate relief and livelihood projects and the rest go to 
terrorist operations.170  Accordingly, bin Laden and Khalifa financed the urban 
warfare and terrorism training in both Libya and in the Philippines of recruits to 
the Abu Sayyaf, dating back to 1991, when the group was founded.171  In 
addition to facilitating its own record of domestic-based terrorism, which has 
included bombings, assassinations, international kidnappings and civilian 
massacres, such as the 1995 Ipil attack, which left 54 Christians dead, the ASG 
has used its foreign contacts to help with the creation of local logistics for 
international Islamic organizations wishing to operate in the Philippines.172  
Concrete evidence of these transnational ties first emerged in 1995 when the 
ASG was linked to a multi-pronged plot to bomb Washington’s embassies in 
Manila and Bangkok, assassinate President Clinton during the 1996 Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting in Subic Bay and destroy U.S. 
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airlines flying trans-Pacific routes from American west coast cities (Operation 
Bojinka).173  Ramzi Yousef developed the plan, the convicted mastermind of the 
1993 attack against the World Trade Centre in New York, who had been 
dispatched to the Philippines as a personal emissary of Bin Laden to establish a 
tactical working relationship with the ASG.174 
Furthermore, the Abu Sayyaf received millions of pesos from foreign 
sources including contributions from Saudi and Pakistani Islamic groups.175  
Libya has played a role of in the negotiations for the release of the ASG’s foreign 
hostages.  In 1991, the ASG received some $6 million, mainly from Al Qaeda and 
Libya, including deliveries of Libyan model weapons from Victor Blout, the Tajik 
arms dealer later linked to both the Taliban regime and Al Qaida.176  Saif Al-
Islam Al-Ghadaffi, the son of the Libyan leader, met with rebel leaders in 
Maguindanao on 13 December 1999 and reintegrated Libya’s commitment in the 
economic development in Mindanao.177  Aside from kidnappings, other ASG 
revenues are derived from taxation, extortion or smuggling.  There is little 
evidence that the group receives voluntary contributions from individuals, NGOs, 
or commercial companies.178  
3.  Environment and Training 
The environment plays an important factor in the operation of an 
organization.  According to Turner, “environment comprised of forces, other 
organizations and individuals with which the organization interacts or which 
affect its operation.”179  The terrorist groups, aside from command and control 
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networks and weapons, need the environment as their operational space to plan, 
train for, and execute their attack.  These will range from urban neighborhoods 
to state sanctuaries, or active and passive support of communities, local, 
national, and transnational.180  Also, history is an environmental factor that 
provides one of the fundamental explanations for the Abu Sayyaf’s capacity to 
survive, and at times even thrive, despite the efforts of the state to erase it.181  
The Abu Sayyaf can be seen as part of a broader movement of Muslim peoples 
spanning several centuries, which refuses to acknowledge the authority of the 
Philippine state, whether independent or colonial.182  Turner further argues that 
the historical context of Abu Sayyaf’s environment helps explain ASG’s 
survival:183 1) the Abu Sayyaf tap into the longstanding Muslim rejection of state 
authority, whether the Spanish, Americans or the republic.  Many Moros view 
their history as four centuries of struggles to defend their fundamental right to 
self determination; 2) the colonial powers succeeded in creating and embedding 
a transcendent Muslim (Moro) identity.  While the component ethno-linguistic 
groups maintain their identities as Tausog, Maranao, Maguindanao or other, they 
have come to share the overarching classification of Moro; 3) a feeling of 
dispossession where land has been alienated, development has by-passed the 
majority of them and their identity has been under sustained attack.  Such 
reflection on history breeds resentment and support. 
Smith mentions that Al Qaeda has flourished in an environment of weak 
or quasi-states, which are undergoing disruptive political or social change.  Such 
areas are not only hospitable to terrorists but also attract transnational crime 
groups, drug traffickers, and maritime pirates.184  This is also the case for Abu 
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Sayyaf where government control of Basilan and Sulu has been limited.  Gates, 
who also examines the micro foundations of rebellion, contends that recruitment 
of rebels is an understanding of those who faced dismal conditions at home due 
to poverty or boredom.185  Similarly, Tan argues that the roots of Muslim rage 
and alienation lie fundamentally in local political, economic and social issues and 
conflicts, whether in Kashmir, Chechnya, Aceh, Patani or Mindanao, or even in 
Western Europe.186  In Southeast Asia, all three separatist rebellions in Aceh, 
Patani and Mindanao, “predated September 11 and Al Qaeda, and have been 
driven by the presence of local grievances such as continuing poverty, 
unemployment and military abuses in Aceh, and Muslim Moro landlessness in 
Mindanao.”187 
Terrorism will be problematic as long as people are disaffected, and 
recent history demonstrates that relatively weak and isolated insurgencies form 
Kosovo to the Southern Philippines became much more deadly and effective 
once they drew upon an international network for a continuous supply of 
recruits, funds, and equipment.188  This is one of the most difficult problems 
faced by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that boundaries between the 
Abu Sayyaf organization and its environment are very blurred.189  Movement 
across the boundaries is easy for Abu Sayyaf members.  They can seek refuge in 
MILF-controlled areas, as the AFP is not officially engaged in hostilities with that 
organization.  They can return to the anonymity of village life or slip over the 
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Basilan Strait to the large city of Zamboanga.190  This collusion between ASG and 
MILF has been confirmed at a congressional hearing by former hostages Sheila 
Tabunag and Reina Malonzo, both working as midwife and nurse respectively at 
Don Jose Torres Memorial Hospital in Lamitan, Basilan, when ASG took them to 
MILF camps sometime in the last quarter of 2001.191  Lastly, the key to Abu 
Sayyaf’s survival has been its ability to adapt to its environment.  It exists in a 
context where resistance to the state is deeply embedded and where the state is 
weak in places where ASG operates.192  As Ressa mentions, Abu Sayyaf is also a 
product of its environment, and ideologues such as Janjalani are rare when the 
daily fight is to put food on the table.  The two provinces that are home to Abu 
Sayyaf, Basilan and Sulu, are predominantly Muslim and among the poorest in 
the nation.193 
The origins of the Abu Sayyaf can also be traced to Afghanistan, and in 
the early 1980’s, between 300 and 500 Moro fundamentalist arrived in Peshawar, 
Pakistan, to serve with the Mujahidin.194  One of them, Ustadz Abdurajak 
Janjalani, emerged as their leader, who attended Islamic universities in Libya and 
Saudi Arabia before joining the mujahidin and fighting the Soviets for several 
years.195  According to International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report, the MILF’s 
ties to Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, and other jihadist groups were forged in 
Afghan training camps in the mid-1980’s, and there is an effort to replicate the 
Afghan experience in Mindanao that now present perhaps the gravest threat to 
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the peace process.196  Persistent reports of links between the separatist Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the regional Jemaah islamiyah (JI) network, and 
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) overshadow the negotiations between the MILF and 
Philippine government in Kuala Lumpur and underscore the growing 
entanglement of deeply rooted domestic insurgencies with the global “war on 
terrorism”.197 
Ramzi Yousef 198 had been training members of the Abu Sayyaf from the 
birth of the group.  In 1991, when Yousef came to Basilan with Abdurajak 
Janjalani to form the fledging group, Janjalani spoke eloquently at the mosques, 
enticing younger Filipinos to find Islam’s true meaning.199  Also, on 23 February 
1992, bin Laden’s brother-in-law, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa met with ASG 
leaders in General Santos City and convinced them to create the Urban Guerilla 
Squad (UGS) to launch terrorist attacks in Zamboanga City.200  It resulted in the 
killing of five people and 40 others wounded when ASG threw a grenade at Fort 
Pilar on 28 August 1992.  Later, other Al Qaeda operatives would help in the 
training of the Abu Sayyaf.  In 1995, Islamic radicals from Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, 
Bosnia, and Yemen would be among those who came to the jungle camps to 
train Abu Sayyaf members.201  The Egyptian Al Bakre, arrested in Maguindanao 
on 02 June 2004, was a bomb instructor at the MILF’s Camp Omar in Datu Piang, 
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Maguindano.202  In 2000, he trained MILF and Jemaah Islmaiyah (JI) members 
in demolitions, explosives, and the manufacturing of rocket-propelled grenades 
inside Camp Abubakar and other MILF camps.203  The Abubakar and Omar 
camps were overrun by the military in 2000, but as part of the continuing peace 
talks between the government and the Muslim rebels, a portion of Camp Omar 
was returned to the MILF as temporary quarters.204  ICG argues that JI’s training 
program in Mindanao was crucial in producing a new generation of operatives 
capable of filling the shoes of Afghan veterans, increasingly depleted by post- 
Bali arrests in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.205  There is growing 
evidence that Camp Hudaibiyah alumni have used their training not only to 
revitalize JI ranks in Indonesia, but also to carry out terror attacks in the 
Philippines itself and breathe new life into the Abu Sayyaf Group.206  
D.   INTERNATIONAL LINKS 
The Al Qaeda was able to establish strong terrorist links in the Philippines 
through the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.207  The 
Philippines served as a major planning hub for Al Qaeda missions worldwide and 
a regional hub for financing radical Islamic organizations.208  Khalifa established 
local branches of the Saudi-based International Islamic Relief Organization 
(IIRO), which channeled funds to both the Abu Sayyaf and Al Qaeda cells in the 
country.209 
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The 2001 trial of Madji Hasan Idris, an Egyptian member of the radical Al 
Wa’d organization, revealed the extent terrorist network.  Al Wa’d would send 
young Egyptian recruits to camps in Kosovo or Pakistan and then dispatch them 
to serve in the Philippines, Kashmir, or wherever else they were needed after 
their training and indoctrination were complete.210  As Takeyh argues, Al Qaeda 
and the symbolic organized-crime networks sustaining terrorist organizations are 
not confined territorially or ideologically to a particular region but instead are 
global in orientation.211  The network in Al Qaeda set up in Southeast Asia is not 
just its new center of training and operations; it is also a model for other regions 
such as Chechnya and East Africa where autonomous Islamic areas can be linked 
together worldwide.212 
Al Qaeda, literally the “Base”, operates both on its own and through an 
interlocking complex of overseas terrorist organizations and cells that links 
extremists in at least 40 countries.213  Among the constituent groups in the 
network are bin Laden’s own Al Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria, the Harakat al Mujahadin that is based in 
Pakistan and operates partially in Kashmir, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 
and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines.214  Al Qaeda, EIJ, and GIA cells have been 
found in numerous countries in Europe, Africa, and the Islamic world.215  Al 
Qaeda operatives have been seeking safer waters in Southeast Asia, a region 
notorious for its porous borders, large populations of urban and rural poor, and 
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both Muslim and non-Muslim armed extremists groups.216  The U.S. State 
Department named the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia as “potential Al 
Qaeda hubs”.217  The U.S. Department of State currently designates the Abu 
Sayyaf Group as one of the 28 Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTD’).218 
Jones, Smith, and Weeding argue that the roots of the Southeast Asian 
terror network, JI and its deepening relationship with Al Qaeda can be traced to 
two geographically separate ethno-religious struggles in the Philippines and 
Indonesia.219  They further argue that the struggles of the two country’s 
rebel/guerilla groups were eventually combined through the auspices of Al Qaeda 
and the global franchising opportunities it exploited from the early 1990’s.220  
Hoffman also argues that bin Laden’s “revolutionary philanthropy”, arms, 
training, and material assistance to Islamic groups as part of furthering the 
global jihad, is meant to facilitate a quid pro quo situation where Al Qaeda 
operatives can call on the logistical services and manpower resources provided 
locally by insurgent forces in Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Chechnya, the Philippines, 
Bosnia, Kashmir, etc..221  However, Turner contends that while Abu Sayyaf 
appears to have international linkages through which it has acquired resources 
and training, there are questions of how much and how regularly.  If the 
resource flow has been plentiful then why has the Abu Sayyaf perpetrated so 
many kidnappings for ransom?222  Turner further asks the question of whether 
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international terrorists wanted close association with the Abu Sayyaf when their 
activities have been regularly condemned by other Philippine Muslim 
organizations as “un-Islamic.”  It is doubtful whether Abu Sayyaf members ever 
considered being oriented to international goals derived from alien sources.223  
As McKenna mentions, the reasons for becoming an armed separatist also 
include “self defense, revenge, plunder, defense of local communities, armed 
coercion, and personal ambition.”224 
Moreover, the post-Soviet era has also witnessed the rise of Afghan Arabs, 
a loose grouping of Islamists who fought together against the Soviets in 
Afghanistan in the 1980’s.225  The thousands of Muslim volunteers who flocked 
to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets have attempted to sustain the momentum of 
that victory by lending their strategic support and firepower to national and 
religious disputes around the world.226  The mujahaddin war against the Soviet 
occupation in Afghanistan had a galvanizing effect, and those Southeast Asian 
Muslims, who received training in weapons and explosives, were indoctrinated in 
militant jihadist worldview and became part of an international clandestine 
network of alumni from that victorious struggle.227  With the war over, many 
returned to Southeast Asia ripe for recruitment into local terrorist organizations 
dedicated to the destruction of non-Muslim communities, Western influence, and 
secular governments.228  As Ressa explains, the call to jihad against the Soviets 
in Afghanistan was highly appealing in Southeast Asia.  In the Philippines, more 
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than 1,000 Muslims made the trip, and when they returned home, they brought 
back the radical ideas and terrorist techniques learned from the camps in 
Afghanistan.229  Abu Sayyaf’s jihad was imported from Al Qaeda, and Janjalani 
would name his group, Abu Sayyaf, after the Pushtun warlord, Abdul Rasul 
Sayyaf, a legendary Afghan mujahideen and founder of the Afghan Islamic 
movement.230  As a result, Southeast Asia emerged in the 1990’s as an 
important sanctuary for Al Qaeda, rather than a theater of operations.231  When 
Al Qaeda sought to establish a local affiliate in 1993-1994, it was able to turn to 
veterans of the anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan.  Southeast Asian veterans 
of Afghanistan became leaders of most every militant group in Southeast Asia, 
including Jemaah Islamiyah, the Kampulan Mujahideen (Malaysia), the Laskar 
Jihad (Indonesia), Guragon Mujahideen and Wae Kah Rah (Southern Thailand), 
and MILF/Abu Sayyaf (Philippines).232 
Initially, the Philippine government denied any strong connection between 
the Philippine local terrorist movements (particularly the Abu Sayyaf) and Al 
Qaeda.233  During the Estrada presidency, Abu Sayyaf was identified as a mere 
criminal group.  However, President Arroyo and the U.S. Department of State 
declared the Abu Sayyaf a terrorist group with links to Al Qaeda.  As Keohane 
mentions, “the government of the Philippines has even invited American military 
advisers to help it defeat an Islamic guerilla movement allegedly linked to Al 
Qaeda.”234  Alternatively, after 9/11, the United States literally ordered a number 
of countries like Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines to deal with their own 
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fundamentalists.235  Thus, the international links of the Abu Sayyaf with Al 
Qaeda and its nexus with MILF and JI, the Philippines’ porous and poorly 
controlled borders, the weakness in intelligence and law-enforcement 
institutions, including the political reluctance to admit the gravity of the threat 
are the counterterrorism challenges being faced by the Philippine government.  
E.   CONCLUSION 
The Abu Sayyaf is changing its tactics and renewing its links with other 
extremists group, as Al Qaeda has increasingly sought to expand its key basing 
and staging region at Southeast Asia.  Al Qaeda’s complicated linkages with 
groups such as Abu Sayyaf, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and Laskar Jihad, and 
the region-wide Jemaah Islamiyah has emerged as a challenge in Asia’s war on 
terror.  The anarchic region of Central Mindanao has become a training base for 
the Southeast Asian terror organizations and a refuge for Abu Sayyaf.  It has also 
become a breeding ground for new terror groups or new core of Abu Sayyaf 
extremists. 
Despite the Philippine government’s success against ASG terrorists, Abu 
Sabaya, Nasser Hapilon, Hamsiraji Sali, Alzhezar Salappudin Jila, Hamid 
Abdulbasar, Jumadil Abdulhan, Julipikar Abdulbassar and Commander Robot, 
comprehensive strategy is necessary in winning the hearts and minds by 
addressing the fundamental political, economic and social grievances in Muslim 
Mindanao. 
Even if the Armed Forces of the Philippines decimate the Abu Sayyaf, the 
unchanged conditions of the Muslim populace, injustice, inequality and poverty 
will continue to breed terrorism and rebellion. 
The government should not ignore Al Qaeda’s international reach and 
lingering presence in the Philippines.  Instead of pursuing a predominantly 
military approach in wiping out Abu Sayyaf and other terrorist organizations, a 
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comprehensive political, economic, ideological measures, and carefully calibrated 
military power should be adopted to counter the terrorists’ organizational and 
operational tools. 
As Maria Ressa mentions, “it has become difficult to address the root 
problems, as it starts with the internal rivalries among the individuals involved, 
aggravated by politics of the organizations they represent, the institutions they 
belong to, and the leaders they report to.”236  She further explains that self-
interest at every level has obscured and twisted every step of the global war on 
terror, and these are the cracks terrorists continue to exploit.237 
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IV.  GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO TERRORISM 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism is a global problem, and no country, region, or people are 
completely immune from terrorist violence.238  Terrorism has become a central 
and controversial issue of global attention.  Within the past 30 years, the 
Philippines have experienced different forms of terrorism.  One was on April 7, 
1976 when three Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) members hijacked a 
Philippine Airlines BAC-111 jetliner from Southern Philippines and ordered it 
flown to Libya.239  In the succeeding years, the Philippines has been beset by 
terrorist attacks from MNLF, and the New Peoples Army.  According to Chalk, 
“between 1990 to 1995, the Philippines have experienced the most terrorist 
violence in Southeast Asian context with 1,030 attacks, yielding a six-year annual 
average of 171 incidents.”240 Accordingly in 1996, a significant 64 incidents were 
added with 1,900 people killed since 1990 making the country one of the most 
severely affected regions in the world in terms of terrorist violence.241  
Historically, most of the political violence was executed by MNLF, who in 1996, 
signed a peace accord with the Philippine government.  However, the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a breakaway faction of the MNLF, and the Abu 
Sayyaf, were the most extreme and dangerous terrorist groups that continue to 
foment violence in the country. 
Professor Christoffersen mentions, “Abu Sayyaf claims it fight for an 
Islamic State but is better known for criminal activities and hostage taking.”242  
                                       
238 L. Paul Bremer III, “The West’s Counterterrorist Strategy” in Western Response to 
Terrorism, eds. Alex Schmid and Ronald Crelinsten (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1993), 255. 
239 Lester Sobel, Political Terrorism Volume 2 (NY: Facts on File, Inc., 1978), 235. 
240 Peter Chalk, Grey-Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia:  Piracy, Drug Trafficking and 
Political Terrorism (Canberra: Australian National University, 1997), 69.  
241 Ibid., 69. 
242 Gaye Christoffersen, “The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Searching for Partners, 
Delimiting Targets,” Strategic Insights, Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate 
School. (2002): 1.    
56 
Unlike the MILF and MNLF, which the government believes to be legitimate 
organizations with real grievances, it labeled the Abu Sayyaf as group of 
terrorists and bandits and has shown absolutely no willingness to negotiate a 
political settlement.243  Abuza also explains that the Philippines is the nexus 
between Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.  JI’s 
continuing ability to regroup and train a new generation of members is 
inextricably linked to the difficult peace process in the southern Philippines.244  
Abuza further contends that the Philippine armed forces failed to maintain the 
momentum generated by the Balikatan exercises in the second half of 2002, and 
with only 250 to 500 ASG fighters in 2003, the Philippine government was unable 
to defeat them.245  However, Smith mentions, “government policies in response 
to terrorism extend beyond courses of action, to include resources and 
capabilities available in the pursuit of its policies.”246 The means (or ‘tools’, e.g., 
police, legislation, equipment) and methods (use of tools) must be identified 
together with an assessment of their utility and effectiveness.247 While the 
solutions to the terrorist threat are complex and not easily devised, terrorism is 
absolutely intolerable, and it is imperative that governments that have been 
targeted for terrorist strikes mobilized their law enforcement, national security, 
and civil preparedness machinery to respond to such crises effectively.248   
This chapter argues that the Philippine government still lacks the capacity 
to respond well to the threats posed by terrorism.  The Philippines’ response to 
terrorism remains ad hoc and reactive rather than decisive and strategic.  
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Despite the initial success of the joint Philippines and U.S. operations against Abu 
Sayyaf, the government failed to maintain the momentum generated by the 
success of “Balikatan 02-1” due to a lack of unifying strategy. 
Moreover, this chapter critically examines the joint Philippine and U.S. 
counterterrorism responses against the Abu Sayyaf.  This chapter focuses on the 
Philippine government capabilities, the needed institutional change, and the 
weakness of the bureaucracy in its response to terrorism.  This chapter also 
examines the importance of legislation in the aspect of countering terrorism.   
B.   JOINT PHILIPPINE AND U.S. RESPONSES AGAINST ABU SAYYAF 
The Philippines gave the strongest response to U.S. appeals for assistance 
in the war on terrorism.  Soon after 9/11, President Macapagal Arroyo saw the 
war on terrorism as an opportunity to engage the Unites States in the 
government’s military campaign against Abu Sayyaf.249  As Abuza mentions, 
“Arroyo saw nothing but opportunity out of the crisis, and she made the most of 
it.”250  President Arroyo, saddled with the problem of terrorism in Mindanao and 
the outlying Sulu Archipelago, immediately rallied her government behind 
President Bush’s call for a global coalition against terrorism.  She supported the 
United States on the war in Iraq and authorized a small military contingent for 
humanitarian and civic mission to help the U.S.-led coalition in restoring order, 
after the ouster of the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. 
In late 2001, Manila allowed U.S. forces to over fly Philippine airspace and 
use airfields as transit points in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan. The United States in turn, provided anti-terrorism training and 
advice, and deployed military personnel, including 160 U.S. Army Special Forces 
troops, to Zamboanga in Mindanao and on Basilan.251  Given the Philippines’ 
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predominantly Catholic population, Arroyo’s position did not expose the 
government to the same pressures as its counterparts in Indonesia and Malaysia.  
Accordingly, the presence of U.S. forces is a sensitive issue, and the decision to 
accept American trainers was a major political gamble.252  However, Elshtain 
explains that “U.S. thoughtful response is within the restrains of just war, and 
many governments including the Philippines are seeking U.S. assistance in their 
fight against indigenous terrorist organization.”253  
The United States became steadily embroiled in the Philippines, 
culminating in the deployment of 1,300 troops, including 160 special operations 
forces.254  In late January 2002, some 660 U.S. forces were deployed to Basilan 
to train Philippine troops and to provide operational assistance, intelligence 
gathering, and air support.  Special Forces numbering 150 would perform 
training and advisory functions; and some of these would accompany AFP unity 
in Basilan.255  Due to the Philippine Constitution, which forbids foreign forces 
fighting in the Philippines, the joint operation was called “Balikatan” 02-1 
(shoulder to shoulder) Training Exercise. Under the “Terms of Reference,” the 
legal document that governed the U.S. role in the Philippines, the Americans 
were not allowed to be directly involved in combat operations, but they could 
join front line troops to advise them and fight back in self-defense.256  There was 
a great deal of confusion in Filipino public opinion regarding both their missions 
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and whether they violated the constitution.257  Professor Christoffersen 
mentions, “their presence remained controversial.”258 For the most part, 
however, the Balikatan exercise had the support of the majority of Filipinos, and 
that Americans withdrew at the end of six-month period assuaged many.259    
The campaign against Abu Sayyaf has seriously degraded the group’s 
capabilities.  From a peak of 1,000 fighters in the mid-1990s, it has dwindled to a 
few hundred.  According to Rabasa, “there is now greater confidence in the 
government’s ability to protect the population.”260 He further mentions that the 
government is improving the conditions in Basilan, providing medical services, 
upgrading roads and rehabilitating an airfield and a wharf.261 Basilan was a 
success story, the United States did civic action projects like roads and water 
well, and there was no follow-up, which made the roads crumbling.262 Trudin 
mentions that the Philippines could provide a model of how to fight global 
terrorism by a combination of force, economic aid and diplomacy.263 On the 
other hand, Rogers argues that if southern Philippines are unaccompanied by 
real change and Mindanao returns to the status quo, as in past attempts to end 
the violence, the fighting will surely resume.264 Roger further contends that the 
U.S. role typically focuses on promoting security and developments but failed to 
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recognize a simple truth: the traditional prerogatives of power in the Southern 
Philippines are incompatible with the thin veneer of democratic institutions.265 
Accordingly, the society in Muslim Mindanao remains feudal, conforming less to 
democratic ideals than to the style of the datus, the warrior-chiefs of old.  
Leadership is personal and paternalistic and functions largely above the law; 
power flows from gun and money.266 
The Philippine Armed Forces failed to maintain the momentum generated 
by the joint Balikatan exercise in the second half of 2002.267  As Abuza mentions, 
“a spate of bombings and a regrouping of rebel forces frustrated the United 
States.”268 In February 2003, American and Filipino officials announced another, 
larger exercise directed at the Abu Sayyaf presence in Jolo, and this was 
interpreted in the Philippines as a declaration that U.S. troops would be illegally 
deployed in a combat role.269  The subsequent outcry forced the cancellation of 
the exercise.270  President Arroyo, who announced in December 2002 that she 
would not run for reelection in 2004, backtracked from her original decision that 
would allow U.S. forces an expanded combat role.271  Days later, the Philippines 
became a victim of a number of terrorist attacks in 2003. These were the car-
bomb attack adjacent to a military airfield in Awang Airport in Cotobato, on the 
southern island of Mindanao on 21 February; the bombing on 4 March at the 
International Airport in Davao, Mindanao that killed 17 (including one U.S. 
citizen); the Sasa Wharf bombing on 2 April also in Davao that killed 15, a series 
of bombings in Koronadal City, Mindanao, that took more than 15 civilian lives as 
                                       
265 Ibid., 4.  
266 Ibid., 4. 
267 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror (Colorado: Lynne 
Reinner Publishers, 2003), 205. 
268 Ibid., 205. 
269 Steven Rogers, “Beyond Abu Sayyaf,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 3 (2004), Pro Quest 
Database (17 March 2004).  
270 Ibid., 3. 
271 Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror (Colorado: Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, 2003), 205. 
61 
well as a number of kidnappings-for-ransom operations.272  Further, the bombing 
of Superferry 14 that killed 116 on 26 February 2004 after an hour of sailing 
from Manila showed a dangerous new alliance of ASG and Rajah Solaiman that 
investigators fear could execute future attacks in the capital.273  The Philippine 
government has been “in a state of denial” about the terrorist threat, and as a 
result, the United States, joined by Australia and Britain, has quietly warned the 
Philippine government that it has not been doing enough to crack down on 
terrorist groups in the country.274  As Acharya mentions, “President Arroyo has 
walked a political minefield and risked substantial domestic discontent in 
soliciting American help in her own war against terrorism, even though the public 
is generally unsympathetic to the militants’ cause”.275 
C.  GOVERNMENT CAPABILITIES 
The Philippine government response to terrorism extends beyond courses 
of action, or intended courses of action, to include resources and capabilities 
available to the bureaucracy in the pursuit of its policies.  For instance, the 
building of a large security force with modern equipment would be useless if the 
force lacks leadership training and experience.  Likewise, if the bureaucracy or 
government authorities do not possess the knowledge or competent advice, the 
force would be committed beyond its capabilities.  The attacked by Filipino 
troops on a hijacked Philippine Air Lines plane two days after it landed at 
Zamboanga Airport in Mindanao on 23 May 1976 is a case in point.  Sobel 
mentions, “in an exchange of gunfire, the aircraft exploded in flames, three 
hijackers and 10 hostages died and 22 other hostages were wounded.”276 
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Government counterterrorism policy is, per se, a resource.277  Policy can 
represent a major and extremely valuable resource in response to terrorism that 
include plans, organizational arrangements, equipment acquisitions, training, 
introduction of regulations, passage of legislation, publicity, domestic and 
international agreements.278  Accordingly, policy can have negative aspects such 
as a poorly directed policy, an inconsistent or wrong policy, inadequately 
expressed or publicized can be as dangerous as the absence of policy.  An 
example, as Rabasa explains, “President Arroyo had criticized her predecessor, 
Joseph Estrada, for succumbing to ‘Malaysian and European pleas to hold the 
troops back,’ and for allowing Libya to arrange a ransom deal with Abu 
Sayyaf.”279  In April 2000, Abu Sayyaf took 21 hostages including 10 foreign 
tourists from a diving resort in Malaysian state of Sabah.  The kidnap netted Abu 
Sayyaf $20 million in ransom money reportedly paid by Libya.280 
Since government counterterrorism policy is a resource, Dreyer mentions 
that “the allocation of scarce resources to dealing with these conflicts reduces 
revenues available for other governmental functions.”281  Jenkins, in an astute 
analysis of the effects of continued conflict, notes a general trend toward nations 
devoting a larger part of their resources to internal security functions.282  The 
concerns over arms acquisitions have not dissipated from year 2000 to 2001 on 
defense spending in Asia-Pacific and armed forces strength.283  In 2000, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and EU/NATO spent 1.8% of their GDP in defense spending 
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and ranks 14th, 15th, and 16th respectively in Asia Pacific defense spending with 
North Korea being the 1st, United States as 8th, and Japan as 20th.284  Such arms 
procurement of the Philippines is an indication of “guns against butter” policy.  
According to Montesano, “in the first nine months of 2003, the Philippines have a 
balance-of-payments deficit of $783 million, compared to a surplus of $751 
million for the same period in 2002.”285  The deterioration in the country’s 
balance of payments led some bank economists in the region to warn of a full-
blown financial crisis for the Philippines in 2004.286  An Asian Developmental 
Bank economists mentions, “the investment problem with the Philippines is a 
problem of many years, and the poor infrastructure of the country is not just a 
lack of investments last year but lack of investments over many years, many 
decades.”287  The economy is also suffering from domestic constraints and the 
Abu Sayyaf contributed to the decline in the stock market and a drop in the value 
of the peso.288  Manila is beset with chronic budget deficits, largely because of 
poor tax collection, that forces the government to borrow heavily abroad and 
must deal with persistent communist and Islamic rebel insurgencies, widespread 
corruption and crime.289  As McNally and Morrison mention, “the government will 
be able to achieve its economic agenda and restore confidence only with the 
cooperation of key institutions and political actors.”290 
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Philippine counter-terrorism policy has come a long way since the early 
1970’s due to a spate of bombings or terrorist attacks perpetrated against the 
government or U.S. companies.  An example was the bombing of two U.S. oil 
company headquarters, Esso and Caltex, in Manila on 22 January 1971.  The 
headquarters were damaged and a Filipino employee was killed.291  Weeks later, 
a bomb exploded on the grounds of the U.S. Embassy in Manila.  Damage was 
minor and no one was hurt.292  The 1976 hijacking of a Philippine Air Lines plane 
on 07 April and 23 May by Muslim rebels indicates that terrorism “waxes and 
wanes” in the Philippine context since the 1970’s.  According to Dreyer, “the 
problem of terrorism is apt to become more, rather than less, acute in the 
future.”293  Jenkins foresees the possible emergence of a semi permanent 
subculture of terrorism, characterized by successive generations of terrorists 
replacing those suppressed.294 
The Philippines, as a matter of policy, should adhere to “no concessions” 
in response to terrorist’s demands including the observance of the rule of law, 
and international cooperation in combating terrorism.  However, these policies 
are sometimes not followed due to the complex socio-political issues involved.  
An example is the Malacanang Memorandum Order Number 21 of the “no-
concession” or “no ransom” policy.295  However, President Estrada was criticized 
for allowing Libya to arrange ransom deal with Abu Sayyaf.296  Abuza argues, 
“no politician can afford to antagonize his Muslim constituencies, and many 
perceive the war on terror as a political liability”.297  An illustration pertains to 
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the controversial Balikatan 03-1 that was originally planned to be conducted in 
Sulu Island of Southern Philippines.  Vice-President Teofisto Guingona expressed 
worries that the holding of the RP-US Balikatan 03-1 military exercise in Sulu 
could trigger more violence and bloodshed.298    
Weakness in the internal security system can have drastic consequences 
on the well being of the nation.299  Malaysia’s readiness to use the Internal 
Security Act (ISA) on the 1987’s Operation Lalang and 1996’s arrest of the 
leaders of Al-Argam movement led to political stability.300  The main weapon 
against the terrorists has been the ISA, which has been used to silence political 
opponents as effectively as religious fanatics.301  On the other hand, liberal 
conceptions of human rights challenged the legitimacy of the International 
Security Act, which allows detention without trial, a legacy of the Malayan 
Emergency (1948-60) that facilitated the suppression of the Communist Party of 
Malaya (CPM).302  Acharya argues that the response of Southeast Asian 
governments to terrorism provides ammunition to those who see democratization 
as part of the problem, rather than a solution, in confronting the terrorist 
challenge. The case for democratization is undermined when one compares the 
responses of Malaysia and Singapore to the swift detention under the ISA, with 
that of Indonesia and the Philippines.303  Further, Eubank and Weinberg argue 
that the resurgence of terrorism has gone hand-in-hand with democratic politics 
and conclude that terrorist groups are 3½ times more likely to emerge in 
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democracies than in undemocratic countries.304  As Acharya explains, “the war 
against terrorism presents government with an opportunity to outmaneuver their 
political opponents and thus easily translates into war against freedom.”305  The 
Arroyo governments lost this opportunity to rally and seriously unify the Filipinos 
against terrorism. 
Moreover, legislation is an important response to the terrorist threat.  
Smith mentions that an important aspect of legislative response is an assurance 
that it serves to counter the threat of terrorism while not making serious 
infringements upon civil rights and freedoms.306  He further mentions, 
“constitutionally-correct emergency legislation should meet that requirement, 
although it may abridge certain civil liberties on a temporary basis.”307  Farrel 
likewise argues, “where the legislation is lacking, government terror is made to 
appear justified through such actions as a declaration of a state of emergency 
and the issuing of decrees.”308  Terrorist groups, on the other hand, make little 
or no pretense at legality and often engage in open defiance of the law.309  The 
Philippines has introduced anti-money laundering laws to enable courts to 
convict those who handle terrorist funds and assets.  On 29 September 2001, the 
anti-money laundering law was signed by President Arroyo who mentions that 
money laundering allows criminals to preserve and enjoy the proceeds of their 
crimes and perpetrate such activities because the country had no anti-money 
laundering law before.310  Under U.S. and OCED’s Financial Action Task Force 
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(FATF) pressure, the Philippines agreed to amend the law to a $10,000 limit 
because the original bill was watered down by Philippine legislators who 
proposed a threshold of $80,000.311  However, banks are likely to continue to 
protect the privacy of their customers, and hence, implicitly facilitate the 
continued use of the international financial system by transnational terrorists.312  
Yet even equipped with the new law, the Philippine government admits it has no 
idea where the Abu Sayyaf and MILF hide their assets, and the law does not 
regulate the hawala system of money transfers.313  According to an IMF/World 
Bank Study, “informal fund transfer systems (hawala) cannot be completely 
eliminated by means of criminal proceedings and prohibition orders, and thus 
addressing such systems will require a broader response, including well-
conceived economic policies and financial reforms, a well developed and efficient 
payment system, and effective regulatory and supervisory frameworks”.314  The 
Philippine government should have reformed its economic and financial status 
based on the IMF/World Bank study.  The U.S. Department of State mentions, 
“poor communication between Philippine law enforcement agencies and the Anti-
Money Laundering Council (AMLC) remains an impediment to effective 
implementation of the amended Anti-Money Laundering Act.”315  The 
amendments of the act granted Central Bank Personnel unfettered access to 
deposit accounts. However, the Central Bank and the AMLC face logistic 
challenges due to a lack of information technology platforms to collect and 
process covered transaction reports.316  The Philippines must adopt “honest to 
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goodness” money laundering implementation plan, which is a condition of the 
Philippines removal from the FATF’s (Financial Action Task Force) list of NCCT 
(Non-Cooperating Countries and Territories). 
D.  INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE BUREAUCRACY 
The central role of the Philippine bureaucracy pertains to accomplishing 
what government wants to do in combating terrorism.  The bureaucracy can 
provide important insights into the identification of successes and failures in 
resolving or reducing the overall terrorist threat.  In addition, by analyzing the 
mistakes or failures of the government, bureaucracy is a way of avoiding similar 
future pitfalls.  The Philippine bureaucracy is the formal administrative 
mechanism through which different policies, programmes, and projects of the 
government are executed.317  The bureaucracy consists of men and women, 
including other resources and materials in administrative agencies.318  The 9/11 
indelible memory of New York police, firemen, and rescue workers climbing the 
stairs of World Trade Center created a vivid image of what public service or 
bureaucracy can mean.  The rescue of Gracia Burnham from Abu Sayyaf denotes 
a similar public service commitment in working with the government. 
On the other hand, government behavior can be understood according to 
the Bureaucratic Politics Model that sees no unitary actor but many actors as 
players who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but 
according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal 
goals.319  An illustration pertains to the competing views of the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) on intelligence and 
security matters.  President Arroyo, on her command conference on Anti-
Terrorism, mentions that she has seen situations where the intelligence service 
of a specific area command does not have the same information as the Regional 
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Police Director, or J2, and the GHQ does not know what a brigade knows.320  
Such bureaucratic competition and lack of coordination becomes exacerbated in 
conditions of resource scarcity.321  This leads to intense competition over 
resources and funding, and a lack of cooperation between the services.322  
According to Abuza, “the Philippines have more than ten intelligence and security 
services spread across numerous cabinet offices, making coordination and 
information sharing all but impossible.”323 
Furthermore, problems in personnel administration have been haunting 
the Philippine bureaucracy.  These include:324 1) the proper staffing of various 
agencies at both the national and local levels; 2) the non-observation or 
distortion of the merit principle in the recruitment and promotion of personnel; 
3) the low salary scale of civil servants; 4) the frequent transfer of personnel, 
and 5) the problem of corruption.  During his presidency, Ramos attracted 
numerous skilled executives and managers to important public positions.  They 
were encouraged to commit their energies to grappling with some of the most 
difficult problems of development and change.325  Under President Ramos, 
cabinet officials were widely known for their intelligence and commitment to 
reform.326  According to Eaton, “Ramos actively pursued reform measures but 
moderately successful because congressmen – elected from single-member 
districts – aggressively defended their particularistic interests and the 
                                       
320 President Arroyo’s Speech during Command Conference on Anti-Terrorism at Cebu City 
on 27 March 2003. <http://www.ops.gov.ph/speeches2003/speech_2003Mar27.htm> (03 June 
2004). 
321 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2003), 236. 
322 Ibid., 236. 
323 Abuza, “Militant,” 236. 
324 Alex Brillantes and Arturo Pacho, “The Bureaucracy” in Government and Politics of the 
Philippines, eds. Raul De Guzman and Mila Reforma (NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), 201. 
325 Merilee S. Grindle, “The Good, the Bad, and the Unavoidable: Improving the Public 
Service in Poor Countries”, in For the People: Can We Fix Public Service, eds. John Donahue and 
Joseph Nye Jr. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 93. 
326 Ibid., 107. 
70 
discretionary powers under control.”327  Eaton argues that legislators in 
candidate-centered electoral systems face incentives to work against reform 
because it harms their ability to provide selective benefits to constituents.328  
This is the case in the Philippines where dispersal of institutional decision-making 
power affects the country’s overall pattern of policy management. An illustration 
pertains to a U.S. Department of State Report that mentions the Philippines, 
since 2001, failed to enact new anti-terrorism legislation for the second straight 
year.329  The report also mentions that major evidentiary and procedural 
obstacles in the Philippines hinder the building of effective terrorism cases 
including generic problems in the law enforcement and criminal justice systems 
such as low morale, inadequate salaries, recruitment and retention difficulties, 
and lack of cooperation between police and prosecutors.330  These conditions 
reported by U.S. Department of State will surely affect the Philippines response 
to terrorism. 
Lastly, Philippine bureaucracy is beset by the perennial problem of graft 
and corruption, and even the prominent members of the past political leadership 
recognized such a problem.331  Other countries in the Asia Pacific, including 
China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Papua New Guinea, 
have all suffered from serious corruption at the top political level in recent years, 
leading to political instability, public disquiet, and public order incidents.332  
Corruption undermines legitimacy and the rule of law, generates public 
discontent, and destroys fiscal responsibility, as sources of government revenue 
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are diverted and decline.333  The study of the College of Public Administration of 
the University of the Philippines on negative bureaucratic behavior pointed out 
that graft and corruption in the Philippines has strongly affected development 
efforts negatively.334  Likewise, Christoffersen mentions, “military corruption is 
said to be a major impediment in tracking Abu Sayyaf.”335  The institutional rot 
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is more serious than a mere matter of 
inadequate funding.336  According to Torres, “Marissa Rante and other hostages, 
on their second night trek with Abu Sayyaf on 30 April 2000, passed at least five 
military detachments but those manning the posts seemed to have turned blind 
and deaf.” 337  Some soldiers pretend they did not see the bandits and hostages, 
while others deliberately let the group pass.338  There was a time when five 
Muslim militiamen guarding a military detachment even talked to Marissa’s Abu 
Sayyaf guard telling them to hurry up while the commander of the militiamen is 
not looking.339  Reynaldo Rubio confirms Marissa’s story when they were rescued 
on 03 May 2000.  Both were teachers of Claret School of Tumahubong, Basilan 
when Abu Sayyaf abducted them on 20 March 2000.340  Despite the looming 
terrorist threat and protracted insurgency, it seems that the numerous efforts by 
successive administrators for reforms did not push through against the 
entrenched interest groups.  As Banlaoi argues, “the Philippines does not have 
an overarching framework to put the acts of its government agencies together in 
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a pursuit of a common strategic goal, such as combating terrorism.”341  Even its 
participation in the global campaign against terrorism reveals its lack of a 
coherent strategy.342 
E.  CONCLUSION 
The Philippine government campaign against Abu Sayyaf has seriously 
degraded the group’s capabilities.  However, the government needs to improve 
and to enhance its capabilities, policies, legislation, and internal security in 
combating terrorism.  The constitutional limitation, the government capabilities, 
and the bureaucracy are the variables that affect the country’s response to 
terrorism.  These variables need necessary reforms in order for the government 
to resolve the threat of terrorism completely.  The government must use its 
resources and capabilities available to undertake the needed task of restructuring 
the bureaucracy, eliminating corruption, and legislating and implementing anti-
terrorism laws.  A strong government capability with a unifying and coherent 
strategy is necessary to respond suitably to terrorism with greater resolve, 
widespread consensus and support. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Philippine government’s response to terrorism remains reactive rather 
than decisive and strategic.  It still lacks the capacity to respond well to threats 
posed by terrorism.  In many respects, the government has regarded terrorism 
as a war rather than as a problem of law and order that requires suitable police 
measures.  This is evident in the lead role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
with the Philippine National Police as the supporting role in the war against 
terrorism in Mindanao.  The measures that the Philippines have taken to fight 
terrorism amount to an incomplete strategy.  The government has developed 
countermeasures to respond to terrorism as they occur, rather than conducting 
an assessment of the overall threat and then planning a comprehensive set of 
responses.  The lack of comprehensive planning can be linked to the Philippines 
being the nexus between Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Abu Sayyaf, and the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front.  JI’s ability to train a new generation of terrorists is 
linked to the protracted insurgency and the complex peace process in the 
southern Philippines.  The anarchic region of Central Mindanao has become a 
training base for the Southeast Asian terror organizations and a refuge for Abu 
Sayyaf. 
As illustrated in Chapter IV, the government failed to maintain the 
momentum generated by the success of “Balikatan 02-1” due to a lack of a 
unifying strategy.  The Arroyo government lost this opportunity to rally and 
seriously unify the Filipinos against terrorism.  Strong domestic public support is 
essential for an effective counterterrorism response.  Despite the looming 
terrorist threats and protracted insurgency, it seems that the numerous efforts 
by successive administrators for reforms were not pushed through against the 
entrenched interest groups.  The Philippines does not have an overreaching 
framework to put the acts of its government agencies together in fighting 
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terrorism, and even its participation in the global campaign against terrorism 
reveals its lack of coherent strategy.343  Furthermore, Philippine counter terrorist 
policies have historically been reactive, with the different government agencies 
and departments operating separately, resulting in lost opportunities and policies 
at odds with another.  Currently, the government is using the “lead agency 
approach” in the implementation of its counterterrorism policies, but it is 
characterized by weak political institutions, poor resources and plagued by 
endemic corruption.  It would be a challenge to coordinate and implement the 
counterterrorism policy operationally because the existing capabilities of 
governmental structure fall short of what is needed.  Even the intelligence 
services are politicized and engaged in bureaucratic infighting when confronting 
threats to national security. 
The Philippines have tried in the past, with only modest success, to 
combat the rise of terrorist radical Islamic groups through a range of political, 
economic, and military means.  It has retaliated militarily, prosecuted terrorists, 
preempted terrorist attacks, implemented defensive measures, and addressed 
some of the causes of terrorism.  To some degree, all suffer from limited 
effectiveness and applicability.  A comprehensive strategy of political, economic 
and ideological measures, including calibrated military power should be adopted 
to counter terrorism.  Therefore, the following options are recommended: 
1. Address Socioeconomic and Political Roots 
The Philippine government should combat terrorism by addressing its 
socioeconomic and political roots.  Getting the comprehensive strategy correct is 
important because the war against terrorism is a political one.  The government 
should consider the perceived deprivation and other grievances that provide 
motives for violence.  This includes political repression, the lack of autonomy, or 
depravity of their rulers, and other issues expressed directly by the terrorists and 
those who sympathize with their cause.  ASG operates in places where the 
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government is weak and the capacity for violence (owning a gun) is an important 
element in local political dynamics.  The counterterrorism efforts in the southern 
Philippines should not consist of tactical military victories alone, but a 
comprehensive political strategy is necessary to achieve long-term victory.  
Political reforms may open up a peaceful channel for dissent. 
The other root conditions include the improvement of living standards and 
socioeconomic prospects in Muslim Mindanao.  As mentioned in Chapter III, the 
roots of Muslim rage and alienation lie fundamentally in local political, economic 
and social issues, whether in Kashmir, Chechnya, Aceh, Patani or Mindanao.  
Dealing with terrorism requires broad and multidimensional efforts in winning 
hearts and minds.  Poverty, a lack of services, inadequate infrastructure, and a 
lack of opportunity have been the characteristics for decades in Muslim 
Mindanao.  It is essential to address the fundamental political, economic and 
social grievances as the root causes of rebellion and terrorism. 
2. No Concession to Terrorists 
The Philippine government should make no concessions to terrorists.  It 
should not pay ransoms, release prisoners, or change it policies or agree to other 
acts that might encourage additional terrorism.  As illustrated in Chapter IV, 
President Arroyo criticized her predecessor, Joseph Estrada, for succumbing to 
Malaysian and European pleas to hold the troops back and for allowing Libya to 
arrange a ransom deal with Abu Sayyaf.  The concession made by Estrada 
resulted in ASG’s additional terrorism including money laundering, weapons 
procurement and recruitment to replenish ASG’s losses and defections.  This 
policy of “no-concession” is based upon the conviction that to give in to 
terrorists’ demands places even more people at risk.  This no-concessions policy 
is the best way of ensuring the safety of the majority of people. 
3. Pursue Greater Regional Cooperation 
ASEAN cooperation is crucial to long-term deterrence to terrorism.  The 
Philippine government can benefit through multilateral and bilateral agreements 
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in the face of continued terrorist threats.  ASEAN is the appropriate organization 
to take the lead on counterterrorism, as the mechanisms and processes are 
already in place such as the annual meetings of heads of state, foreign ministers, 
military chiefs, intelligence chiefs, and police chiefs.344  Also, the Philippine 
government needs to follow up and enhance the trilateral anti-terrorism 
agreement it has with Malaysia and Indonesia on May 2002 that covers 
terrorism, money laundering, smuggling, drug trafficking, hijacking, people 
smuggling, and piracy.  ASEAN +3, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) can serve as forums to operationalize the 
collaborative security and anti-terrorism activities. 
4.  Establish a Dedicated Intelligence Center on Terrorism 
The success in combating terrorism is predicated on the availability of 
timely and accurate intelligence.  Currently, several agencies and departments of 
the Philippine government process intelligence within their own facilities, and 
there is no consolidated center that collects and analyzes information from those 
agencies participating in anti-terrorist activities.  Given the highly fluid and 
transnational nature of terrorism that the Philippines is facing, it is necessary to 
establish a central facility that would improve the government’s capability to 
understand and anticipate future terrorist threats.  It would also support national 
crisis management and provide a common database accessible to various 
Philippine agencies.  The center should have the ability to identify and target the 
intelligence gathering and reconnaissance activities of terrorist organizations. 
The intelligence center should also solve the institutional barriers of the 
powerful, autonomous and resilient Philippine intelligence agencies.  There must 
be an intelligence reform to handle overlapping missions and functions of the 
said intelligence agencies.  The shortfalls in intelligence sharing, intelligence 
databases, collection efforts, intelligence fusion and human intelligence should 
be solved immediately.  These shortfalls must have a plan of action that should 
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address policy, people, processes or technology in order to combat terrorism in 
the years to come.  Furthermore, private sector cooperation is needed, 
particularly with business people, journalists, and members of academe, who 
possess a reservoir of knowledge and perspectives. 
5. Implement Effective and Good Governance 
The Arroyo government should implement effective and efficient 
governance with far-reaching policy reforms. The emergence of ASG denotes the 
government’s weakness in capacity for reform as part of governance.  Lacking 
also is the counterterrorism structure and strategy at the provincial, city and 
municipal level. The complexities of managing such a vast and institutionally 
diverse bureaucracy contributed to the lack of preparedness seen during the 
many terrorist attacks waged against the Philippines. The government must craft 
carefully its national strategy and method of implementation in the battle against 
terror. An effective and efficient bureaucracy, through good governance, can 
provide important insights into the identification of successes and failures in 
resolving the overall terrorist threat. In addition, by analyzing the mistakes or 
failures of the government, bureaucracy is a way of avoiding similar future 
pitfalls. 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, the problems in personnel administration 
have been haunting the Philippine bureaucracy, especially corruption. The Ramos 
presidency attracted numerous skilled managers widely known for their 
commitment to reform. Lastly, good governance should enhance the country’s 
preparedness against terrorism by instituting capacity building and transparency 
in the government. The citizenry and the private sector would be willing to share 
the counterterrorism responsibility if the majority of the Filipinos see efficient, 
honest, and effective governance.  
6. Legislation 
Terrorism is a bipartisan issue. The increase in terrorist threats should be 
resolved by Congress to ensure appropriate punishment of terrorists.  The Arroyo 
78 
administration and Congress need to work together to implement a national 
strategy or government-wide solution on overall leadership and coordination to 
combat terrorism. The focal point (either lead agency or Executive Secretary) in 
the government remains ad hoc and there is no clear consensus on whom and 
where the focal point should be for purposes of coordination, responsibilities and 
leadership. The focal point needs to address the overall leadership, coordination 
issues, including the budgetary requirements. The President needs to appoint a 
single focal point that has the responsibility and authority for all the leadership 
and coordination functions to combat terrorism. This focal point should be 
established by legislation to provide legitimacy and authority, and the Philippine 
President, with the consent of the Philippine Senate, should appoint its head. 
This would provide accountability to both the President and Congress. It would, 
likewise, provide continuity across administrations.  
Furthermore, there should be a continuous review by Congress on the 
upgrade of security measures on airport and port security. This is to determine 
whether legislation or other administrative measures are necessary. Another is 
the identification of the roles of local governments, such as municipal, city, and 
provincial. Although combating terrorism is primarily a national government 
responsibility, provincial, municipal, and local emergency units are certain to be 
the first to respond to terrorism. The Executive and Congress should clearly 
define the preparedness and deployment of local governments` assets. The role 
of local government units should be included in the national strategy to combat 
terrorism. Congress’s legislative role in combating terrorism, though limited, has 
important aspects. Aside from providing the needed resources for a sustained 
counterterrorist effort, it is the job of Congress to declare objectives/regulations 
on human rights, law enforcement and intelligence. Lastly, Congress supplies the 





It has often been said that terrorism is a perennial and ceaseless struggle. 
Terrorism has existed for 2,000 years and owes its survival to an ability to adapt 
and adjust to challenges and countermeasures to identify and exploit its 
opponent’s vulnerabilities.345  The government can neither eliminate terrorism 
out of Mindanao, nor protect Manila from terrorism until it applies the full force 
of the law not only to the terrorists and bandits, but also to officials guilty of 
corruption and use of public power for personal gain.  Without an effective 
government, the terrorist influence cannot be eliminated. What is needed is the 
political will to implement the necessary reforms in the bureaucracy.  Chapter II 
demonstrated the need to enhance and to improve the organizational structure 
of the agencies of the Philippine government to address the problem of terrorism 
in the country.  It is imperative that overlapping missions and functions of 
various government agencies be handled accordingly.  The Department of 
National Defense (DND) should undertake an honest assessment of the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) capability against terrorism.  The AFP and its 
intelligence service are spread too thin with other important and more pressing 
security threats to accomplish.  For example, the AFP must focus on the revived 
threat posed by the communist New People’s Army, the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front, and the Abu Sayyaf Group, in addition to Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, 
and other transnational criminals involved in drug trafficking, kidnapping, and 
money laundering.  Fighting transnational crimes, insurgency, and terrorism 
require rethinking of the AFP’s capabilities, operational concepts, organizations, 
and ways of cooperating with other key actors in the campaign.  Chapter II also 
explained that the structural weakness of the Philippine bureaucracy, as channels 
of policy action, affects the Philippine response to terrorism.  Therefore, 
Philippine policymakers must improve the government structure and its 
instrumentalities in order to play a vital role in the campaign against terrorism. 
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This campaign requires a thorough analysis on how to improve the Philippine 
counterterrorism policy, the inter-agency coordination, intelligence sharing, and 
enhancement of military and police capabilities. 
Chapter III discussed that the key to Abu Sayyaf’s survival has been its 
ability to adapt to its environment, where resistance to the state is deeply 
embedded and where the government is weak in places where ASG operates.  
Chapter III also outlined Abu Sayyaf’s organizational and operational tools in the 
maintenance of its terrorist capability.  This raised the question of how best to 
counter it.  
Even if the Armed Forces of the Philippines decimated the Abu Sayyaf, the 
unchanged conditions of the Muslim populace, injustice, inequality and poverty 
will continue to breed terrorism and rebellion.  Operation Balikatan in 2002 did 
not completely eliminate the Abu Sayyaf because the situation that gave rise to 
ASG, such as poverty, the lack of basic services, inadequate infrastructure, and 
lack of opportunity is still present in Mindanao.  Furthermore, the government 
should not ignore Al Qaeda’s international reach and lingering presence in the 
Philippines. Instead of pursuing a predominantly military approach in eliminating 
Abu Sayyaf and other terrorist organizations, comprehensive political, economic, 
ideological measures, and carefully calibrated military power should be adopted 
to counter terrorists’ organizational and operational tools.  
This study has shown that the government must undertake the needed 
task of restructuring the bureaucracy, eliminating corruption, legislating and 
implementing anti-terrorism laws. The Philippines remains attractive to terrorist 
groups due to reasons mentioned in the preceding chapters. Said problems could 
not be solved by a military solution but by a fundamental institution-building 
necessary to address the root causes in the long-term. The threats of Abu Sayyaf 
still remain due to the continued presence in Southeast Asia of Al Qaeda’s 
independent cells networking with the ASG and MILF.  Central Mindanao has 
become a refuge for outlaws and a breeding ground for new terror groups. Abu 
81 
Sayyaf is making a comeback, and the group is renewing links with other 
terrorist and insurgent groups. Good governance and a comprehensive strategy 
are necessary to respond to terrorism with greater resolve and widespread 
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